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Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional
Common Law*
By Gillian E. Metzger**
I. INTRODUCTION
Much has changed in constitutional law since 1975 when Henry
Monaghan published his Harvard Law Review Foreword on
Constitutional Common Law.' Whole areas of doctrine have been
born - and in some cases died.2 Yet Constitutional Common Law
remains remarkably au courant. Indeed, it presaged several of the
central themes in constitutional law scholarship over the last decade,
such as the role of the political branches and popular movements in
constitutional interpretation or the relationship of constitutional
* This article was originally published by the Columbia University Law
Review in 2010 and can be located at I10 Colum. L. Rev. 479 (2010). J. NAALJ
obtained permission to reprint this article both from the Columbia University Law
Review and the author.
** Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. Special thanks to Mitchell
Berman, Ariela Dubler, Joseph Landau, Trevor Morrison, Nate Persily, Jim
Pfander, Peter Strauss - and, above all, Henry Monaghan. This Essay also
benefitted from helpful comments at Northwestern University Law School's
Constitutional Law Colloquium. Esha Bhandari and the staff of the Columbia Law
Review provided excellent editorial assistance.
I Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term - Foreword:
Constitutional Common Law, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1975) [hereinafter Monaghan,
Constitutional Common Law].
2 Contemporary constitutional doctrine allowing limits on campaign
contributions, for example, was crystallized in 1976 with the Court's decision in
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), but now seems headed for significant
curtailment, if not extinction. See Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 262-65 (2006)
(invalidating contribution and expenditure limits at issue, with several concurring
opinions raising questions about the continued viability of the Buckley framework).
The extensive constitutional case law on the use of race in affirmative action has
also grown up in this period, starting with Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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doctrine to constitutional meaning. 3 More importantly, the practice
of constitutional common law continues to this day and so too does
the debate over its legitimacy.
By constitutional common law Monaghan referred to "a
substructure of substantive, procedural, and remedial rules drawing
their inspiration and authority from, but not required by, various
constitutional provisions... [and] subject to amendment, modification,
or even reversal by Congress."' Such common law rules, he argued,
represent "a surprising amount of what passes as authoritative
constitutional 'interpretation"' - a feature of our constitutional practice
obscured by the "mystique surrounding Marbury v. Madison"5 and
the Marbury view of the Court as the "authoritative and final"
determiner of constitutional meaning. 6 Monaghan gave several
examples of this phenomenon, moving from structural matters like
the dormant Commerce Clause to individual liberties, most famously
some of the Court's seminal criminal procedure rulings such as the
warnings required under Miranda v. Arizona.' In each of these
3 The scholarship on each of these topics is extensive, so the following list
makes no attempt to be comprehensive. For discussions of the role of the political
branches and social movements in constitutional interpretation, see Larry D.
Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review
(2004); Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Construction: Divided Powers and
Constitutional Meaning (1999); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Popular
Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, and Judicial Supremacy, 92 Cal. L. Rev. 1027
(2004) [hereinafter Post & Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism]; Larry Alexander &
Lawrence B. Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1594 (2005)
(book review). For discussions of the relationship between constitutional doctrine
and constitutional meaning, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Implementing the
Constitution (2001) [hereinafter Fallon, Implementing]; Mitchell N. Berman,
Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 Va. L. Rev. 1 (2004); Kermit Roosevelt III,
Constitutional Calcification: How the Law Becomes What the Court Does, 91 Va.
L. Rev. 1649 (2005); David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 190 (1988) [hereinafter Strauss, Prophylactic Rules].
4 Monaghan, Constitutional Common Law, supra note 1, at 2-3.
Id. at 2 (citing 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)).
6 Id.
7 384 US. 436, 467-68 (1966); Monaghan, Constitutional Common Law, supra
note 1, at 3-26.
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contexts, the Court expressly acknowledged that its constitutional
rulings were to some extent revisable by Congress.8
From the outset, some scholars have condemned constitutional
common law as illegitimate judicial lawmaking or, alternatively, as
insufficiently protective of constitutional rights.9 Indeed, the Court
itself was notably ambivalent about Congress's ability to revise
judicial constitutional determinations.10 Over the years, the Court
has become more reluctant to characterize its constitutional rulings as
contingent or acknowledge a robust role for Congress in
constitutional individual rights interpretation. The 2001 decision in
Dickerson v. United States is a prime exemplar of this trend: While
not insisting that "the Miranda warnings are required by the
Constitution, in the sense that nothing else will suffice to satisfy
constitutional requirements," the Court in Dickerson concluded that
the Miranda warnings represented a constitutional rule binding on
8 See Illinois v. City ofMilwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 107 (1972) ("It may happen
that new federal laws ... may in time pre-empt the field of federal common law of
nuisance."); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467 (acknowledging Congress may devise
"potential alternatives" to Court's Miranda warnings); Prudential Ins. Co. v.
Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 425 (1946) (noting Court has sustained congressional
action "contradicting the Court's previously expressed view that specific action
taken by the states in Congress' silence was forbidden by the commerce clause");
Monaghan, Constitutional Common Law, supra note 1, at 11, 20, 27-30 ("Where
the Court's rule is perceived to have gone too far, it can be rejected or modified by
the political process without the necessity of a constitutional amendment."); see
also Bush v. Lucas, 462 US. 367, 389-90 (1983) (post-"Constitutional Common
Law" decision bearing out Monaghan's prediction that congressional actions may
determine whether a Bivens action will lie).
9 See infra text accompanying notes 125-129. Indeed, some scholars have
rejected Monaghan's claims that these decisions represent constitutional common
law at all. See, e.g., Joseph D. Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A
Question of Article III Legitimacy, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 100, 119-22 (1985) (arguing
that constitutional common law includes rules that "seem[] to be of the pure
Marbury variety," including rules with respect to the right to counsel); Thomas S.
Schrock & Robert C. Welsh, Reconsidering The Constitutional Common Law, 91
Harv. L. Rev. 1117, 1138-40 (1978) (rejecting argument that Congress's power to
authorize dormant Commerce Clause violations is an instance of constitutional
common law).
Io See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 US. 641, 651 n.10, 652-56 (1966)
(upholding congressional prohibition on many English literacy voting
qualifications but noting that Congress lacks power to dilute judicially determined
constitutional protections).
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Congress, at least to the extent of necessitating invalidation of a
congressional statute that the Court characterized as intended to
overrule Miranda." Similarly indicative is the Court's greater
scrutiny of congressional enactments under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment and its insistence in that context on Marbury-
style judicial review with the Court as the supreme arbiter of
constitutional meaning.'2 Significantly, the Court also has not
identified a role for Congress when expanding the scope of
constitutional protections, thus signaling that its reluctance to involve
Congress is not simply a reflection of a narrower view of the
constitutional rights involved.13
" 530 U.S. 428, 437-43 (2000). Dickerson is ambiguous as to whether a
congressional effort to replace the Miranda warnings would be constitutionally
acceptable, limiting itself to noting that the substitute Congress enacted, a totality
of the evidence analysis, was not adequate and was rejected by the Court in
Miranda itself. Id. at 441-43. Even so, the Court's characterization of the warnings
as a constitutional rule contrasts notably with its earlier, post-Miranda precedent
that described the warnings as not constitutionally mandated, and with other
decisions more overtly acknowledging a role for the political branches. See id. at
450-54 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing and quoting from intervening decisions
stating the Miranda warnings were not constitutionally protected); see also Smith v.
Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 265 (2000) (describing Anders rule for when appointed
counsel have fulfilled their duties of representation on appeal as a "prophylactic
rule" and stating that "states are free to adopt different procedures, so long as those
procedures adequately safeguard a defendant's right to appellate counsel");
Roosevelt, supra note 3, at 1668-72 (discussing Dickerson and Smith).
12 See City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519, 536 (1997) (stating that
Congress's power "extends only to 'enforcing' the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment," not to determining "what constitutes a constitutional violation," and
that "the courts retain the power, as they have since Marbury v. Madison, to
determine if Congress has exceeded its authority under the Constitution" (alteration
in original)); see also Bd of Trs. of the Univ. ofAla. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374
(2001) (holding "Congress is the final authority as to desirable public policy," but
cannot "rewrite the Fourteenth Amendment law laid down by this Court").
13 See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2816-17 (2008)
(making no reference to a congressional role in defining scope of Second
Amendment right to possess a gun for self-defense in the home, other than noting
that longstanding prohibitions on firearms possession were not being called into
question); Crawford v. Washington, 541 US. 36, 42-65 (2004) (making no
reference to alternative rules Congress or the states could adopt in holding
Confrontation Clause bars testimonial out-of-court statements by witnesses). The
closest the Court has come to acknowledging an implementation role for the
political branches (state as well as federal) was its recent decision in Melendez-
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Yet the Court's resistance to acknowledging constitutional
interpretive plurality has not spelled the end of constitutional
common law. One area in which constitutional common law remains
particularly prevalent, though largely unrecognized as such, is
ordinary administrative law. 14 Administrative law is generally
understood as having constitutional as well as what I will call
"ordinary law" components - with ordinary law here referring to
statutory and regulatory requirements, such as the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA)" or Executive Order 12,86616 and associated
administrative law doctrines." What is less often acknowledged,
Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2540-42 (2009), in which it noted with
seeming approval state notice-and-demand statutes as a mechanism for meeting the
demands of the Confrontation Clause. See also Jennifer B. Sokoler, Note, Between
Substance and Procedure: A Role for States' Interests in the Scope of the
Confrontation Clause, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 161 (2010). In another decision last
term, Corley v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1558, 1562 (2009), the Court accepted
without discussion Congress's power to limit the Court's McNabb-Mallory doctrine
excluding confessions made during periods of unreasonable delay before
presentment to a judge, but this reflected the understanding of McNabb-Mallory as
an exercise of the Court's supervisory power over the federal courts rather than a
constitutionally mandated requirement that would apply to state courts as well.
14 Many of Monaghan's specific examples remain good law as well,
particularly those involving constitutional structure, such as the dormant
Commerce Clause and interstate water pollution. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. et al.,
Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System 660-63 (6th ed.
2009) [hereinafter Hart and Wechsler] (recognizing power of federal courts to
make common law in dormant Commerce Clause context); see also Gillian E.
Metzger, Congress, Article IV and Interstate Relations, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 1468,
1480-85 (2007) (describing Congress's power to authorize state violations of the
dormant Commerce Clause). Recent decisions on Bivens actions all fall into the
constitutional common law mold, although the Court's Bivens jurisprudence also
reveals substantial retrenchment in the availability of Bivens actions. Hart and
Wechsler, supra, at 733-42. Perhaps the most frequent instance of constitutional
common law today, however, is application of the constitutional canons in statutory
interpretation. See infra text accompanying notes 135-137.
155 US.C. § 551 et seq. (2006).
16 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted as amended in 5 US.C. § 601 (2006).
17 See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
US. 29, 42-44 (1983) (explicating meaning of APA's "arbitrary and capricious"
standard); see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness
and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 461, 463-64 (2003)
[hereinafter Bressman, Beyond Accountability] (distinguishing between ordinary
administrative law and constitutional administrative law).
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especially by courts, is the degree to which constitutional concerns
permeate ordinary administrative law, in particular doctrines of
judicial review of agency action. A striking example of this lack of
acknowledgment is the 2009 decision in FCC v. Fox Television
Stations, Inc., in which the Court expressly refused to link ordinary
administrative law to constitutional concerns.' 8
Fox involved a challenge to the FCC's new policy imposing
greater restrictions on broadcast of indecent language. In a 5-4
decision, the Court rejected the claim that the FCC had failed to
adequately justify its change in policy and thereby violated the APA's
prohibition on arbitrary and capricious agency action. Justice Scalia's
majority opinion focused on defeating the suggestion that an agency
necessarily faces a higher burden to explain a change in existing
policy than to adopt a new policy when none previously had
existed.19 But the opinion also denied that agency decisions
implicating constitutional liberties trigger more stringent arbitrary
and capricious review. Instead, the Court said, whether an agency
action is "arbitrary and capricious" and whether it is unconstitutional
are "separate questions."2o Arguing that the canon of constitutional
avoidance applied only to judicial review of statutory language,
Justice Scalia stated that "the only context in which constitutionality
bears upon judicial review of authorized agency action" is when a
court determines the agency action is unconstitutional.21 He
dismissed the dissent's suggestion that the agency be required to
reconsider its policy in light of constitutional concerns, terming such
an approach "judicial arm-twisting or appellate review by the wagged
finger."22
18 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1812 (2009) ("If the Commission's action here was not
arbitrary or capricious in the ordinary sense, it satisfies the Administrative
Procedure Act's 'arbitrary [or] capricious' standard; its lawfulness under the
Constitution is a separate question to be addressed in a constitutional challenge.").
" Id. at 1810 (stating there is "no basis in the Administrative Procedure Act or
in our opinions for a requirement that all agency change be subjected to more
searching review").
20 Id at 1812.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 1812 n.3. In his dissent, Justice Breyer emphasized that First
Amendment censorship concerns are "as closely related to broadcasting regulation
as is health to the environment" and that the FCC had justified its prior policy
normally permitting single fleeting use of an expletive "upon the need to avoid
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Simply stated, my argument here is that Fox is wrong in positing
a strict separation between constitutional and ordinary administrative
law. The Court's protestations aside, constitutional concerns often
affect judicial review of authorized executive action. In fact,
constitutional law and ordinary administrative law are inextricably
linked: Statutory and regulatory measures are created to address
constitutional requirements; constitutional concerns, particularly
those sounding in separation of powers, underlie core ordinary
administrative law doctrines; and agencies are encouraged to take
constitutional concerns seriously in their decisionmaking. The net
result is that a fair amount of ordinary administrative law qualifies as
constitutional common law. Its doctrines and requirements are
constitutionally informed but rarely constitutionally mandated, with
Congress and agencies enjoying broad power to alter specific
administrative mechanisms notwithstanding their constitutional
aspect.
Recognizing the interrelationship between constitutional law and
ordinary administrative law is important both for the ongoing debate
over the legitimacy of constitutional common law and for the proper
appreciation of the role administrative agencies can play in our
constitutional order. Underlying many attacks on constitutional
common law is a vision of constitutional law as having a narrow and
determinate scope, with a clear divide separating constitutional and
nonconstitutional law. Yet, in the context of administrative law at
least, this divide simply does not exist. Although some
administrative law requirements are plainly constitutionally required
and others clearly rooted only in statutory or regulatory enactments, a
number of basic doctrines occupy a middle ground. The latter are
simultaneously based in ordinary law and constitutional law, and
these two dimensions are too overlapping and interactive to be
isolated. Administrative law thus suggests that the vision of
constitutional law as a distinct and determinate entity is a false one.
Moreover, this overlapping and interactive relationship between the
constitutional and ordinary dimensions of administrative law,
treading too close to the constitutional line." Id. at 1833 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Contending that the FCC's two-sentence explanation of the change in its view
about the constitutionality of prohibiting fleeting use was inadequate, he argued
that "the FCC's failure to address this aspect of the problem calls for a remand to
the agency." Id. at 1835 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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combined with Congress's broad control over the latter, is what
serves to transform ordinary administrative law into a species of
constitutional common law.
Of course, that as a descriptive matter judges infuse constitutional
values into their development of administrative law doctrines or
readings of ordinary administrative requirements does not, standing
alone, suffice to justify the practice. But this deeply embedded
practice does indicate the degree of disruption that would result were
constitutional common law extirpated from administrative law.
Moreover, the normative basis needed to justify such a disruption is
lacking. In particular, seeking to enforce constitutional norms
through ordinary administrative law better accords with
constitutional principles, and may be less intrusive on the
policymaking prerogatives of the political branches, than efforts to
segregate out the two. This is true of judicial development of
administrative law doctrines that respond to constitutional concerns
associated with administrative government, for instance the doctrinal
requirement of at times quite searching scrutiny of the reasonableness
of agency decisionmaking. Such doctrines are closely akin to other
common moves in the judicial constitutional law repertoire, in
particular constitutional avoidance canons. In addition, addressing
these concerns through ordinary administrative law preserves a
degree of flexibility that better accommodates changing regulatory
needs and Congress's primacy in structuring government than do
more immutable constitutional law prescriptions, and is also more
likely to yield meaningful constraints.
But the benefits of addressing constitutional concerns through
ordinary administrative law are especially evident with respect to the
form of administrative constitutionalism condemned in Fox: judicial
use of ordinary administrative law to encourage agencies to take
constitutional concerns seriously in their own decisionmaking.
Administrative agencies today are responsible for much of the federal
government's decisionmaking. Excluding such primary
decisionmakers from a judicially enforceable obligation to include
significant constitutional concerns in their deliberations is at odds
with the structural imperatives of our constitutional system. Agencies
are not only well positioned to enforce constitutional norms
effectively, but they are also better able than courts to determine how
to incorporate constitutional concerns into a given regulatory scheme
with the least disruption. In addition, it is far easier for agencies to
30-2
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respond to judicial decisions remanding administrative actions for
failure to take account of constitutional concerns than for Congress to
respond to judicial invalidation of measures on constitutional grounds
or judicial narrowing of statutes through the application of
constitutional canons.
To my mind, the better critique is not the extent to which
constitutional common law surfaces in administrative contexts, but
rather the lack of transparency that accompanies it. The causes of the
Court's reluctance to acknowledge the constitutional dimension of
ordinary administrative law are murky, but likely center on concerns
with preserving the proper judicial role - both ensuring that courts do
not intrude into the policymaking realm of the political branches and
protecting the Court's supremacy in constitutional interpretation.
Whatever the cause, the harmful effects of this reluctance are evident.
Judicial failure to openly acknowledge the constitutional role played
by ordinary administrative law has left our understandings of the
constitutional demands imposed on the modern administrative state
underdeveloped and untested by criticism. This failure has further
meant that the capacity of administrative agencies to advance and
protect constitutional norms remains largely unexploited. At the same
time, judicial obfuscation has undermined the extent to which
agencies are held accountable for the constitutional judgments they
do make.
In what follows, Part I identifies a number of ways that
constitutional concerns permeate ordinary administrative law and
argues that the net result is best understood as constitutional common
law. Part II then analyzes the implications of this characterization of
ordinary administrative law for the debate over constitutional
common law and seeks to justify the use of ordinary administrative
law to ensure that administrative agencies take constitutional
concerns seriously in their decisionmaking.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMON LAW IN ADMINISTRATIVE CONTEXTS
Constitutional law regularly surfaces in administrative contexts,
shaping how agencies make decisions, the substance of those
decisions, and judicial review of agency decisionmaking. Yet that
role is surprisingly unacknowledged and unspecified, particularly by
429
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courts.23Similarly unremarked is the influence that ordinary
administrative law has on defining the scope of constitutional rights.
These two features - the tacit and indeterminate role played by
constitutional concerns, as well as the reciprocal relationship between
statutory or regulatory administrative mechanisms and constitutional
requirements - mean that Congress has power over the substance of
administrative law, including its constitutional components.
Combined with the evolving and emergent quality of many ordinary
administrative law doctrines, the net result is a form of constitutional
common law.
A. Connections Between Constitutional Law and Ordinary
Administrative Law
Constitutional law's manifestations in administrative contexts can
usefully be divided into three categories. First, ordinary
administrative law provides mechanisms that are either
constitutionally mandated or that avoid constitutional violations.
Second, constitutional norms and concerns underlie and are evident
in a number of administrative law doctrines. Third, both courts and
the political branches sometimes use doctrinal mechanisms and
substantive requirements to encourage agencies to take constitutional
concerns seriously, with the result that constitutional concerns
influence the shape of agency decisionmaking.
1. Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutionally Mandated. -
The most obvious point of contact between ordinary administrative
law and constitutional law is that ordinary administrative constraints
on executive officials are sometimes constitutionally required.
Perhaps the classic example is provisions for administrative hearings,
which are often adopted to satisfy procedural due process's
23 Scholars periodically notice the constitutional underpinnings of ordinary
administrative law doctrines. See, e.g., Bressman, Beyond Accountability, supra
note 17, at 468 (noting "possibility that the concern for arbitrariness, a staple of
administrative law, actually emanates from the constitutional structure"); Kevin M.
Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116 Yale L.J 952, 958-59
(2007) (arguing Chenery principle is implementation of nondelegation doctrine);
see also William D. Araiza, In Praise of a Skeletal APA: Norton v. Southern Utah
Wilderness Alliance, Judicial Remedies for Agency Inaction, and the Questionable
Value of Amending the APA, 56 Admin. L. Rev. 979, 1002 (2004) (noting "the
maxim that administrative law is applied constitutional law").
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requirements of notice and some opportunity to be heard.24 Another
instance involves the First Amendment. The Court has repeatedly
held that administrative licensing systems or other forms of prior
restraint based upon the content of speech must contain objective
standards to circumscribe official discretion in order to be
constitutional, as well as procedural safeguards such as the right to
speedy judicial review of any administrative license denial. 25 Most
recently, the Court's decisions on parade licensing have underscored
the importance of officials' being required to explain their decisions,
a typically administrative requirement.26
24 See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 US. 209, 216-17, 225-30 (2005)
(detailing administrative system used for classifying prisoners for supermax, which
included provisions for notice, hearing, and internal review, and concluding that
this system, devised on the eve of trial, satisfied procedural due process
requirements); see also Matthew C. Stephenson, The Price of Public Action:
Constitutional Doctrine and the Judicial Manipulation of Legislative Enactment
Costs, 118 Yale L.1 2, 31-32 (2008) (arguing that in a number of instances
government is required to use elaborate procedures if adopting a constitutionally
doubtful decision).
2 See City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 US. 750, 769-72
(1988) (invalidating ordinance giving mayor complete discretion in granting or
denying permits to place news racks on public property); Freedman v. Maryland,
380 US. 51, 58-59 (1965) (requiring procedural safeguards for film licensing
system to be constitutional, including prompt access to court to review license
denial); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 US. 569, 575-76 (1941) (upholding parade
and march regulation as interpreted by state court to deny town arbitrary or
unfettered discretion over issuance of permits); see also Forsyth County v.
Nationalist Movement, 505 US. 123, 133 (1992) (holding county parade fee
ordinance unconstitutional because it lacked objective standards for fee
assessments, did not require explanations for fee decisions, and did not provide for
review); Reuel E. Schiller, Free Speech and Expertise: Administrative Censorship
and the Birth of the Modem First Amendment, 86 Va. L. Rev. 1, 2-3 (2000)
(discussing historical intertwining of free speech claims and administrative law).
26 See Forsyth County, 505 US. at 133 (noting ordinance in question does not
require administrator to explain his decision and finding "such unbridled
discretion" constitutionally prohibited); see also Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534
US. 316, 324 (2002) (upholding parade licensing scheme that limited factors
government officials could consider, required that reasons for any denials be
clearly explained, and subjected decisions-to review); Seattle Coal. to Stop Police
Brutality v. City ofSeattle, 550 F.3d 788, 798 (9th Cir. 2008) ("The Supreme Court
has expressed particular concern about statutes that do not require the licensor to
'provide any explanation for his decision, and [where] that decision is
unreviewable."' (alteration in original) (quoting Forsyth County, 505 US. at 133)).
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In other contexts, specific administrative mechanisms are not
constitutionally mandated but suffice to avoid constitutional
violations. A prime example here arises in regard to Bivens actions. 27
On several occasions, the Court has identified the availability of
administrative complaint systems to redress individual harms as a
factor counting against implying a Bivens damages remedy.28 Yet
another example is the separation of functions requirements of the
APA and other provisions for independent agency review.29
Although the Court has rejected the claim that combining
investigative and adjudicatory functions necessarily violates due
process, it has also acknowledged the possibility that such a
combination may undermine an individual's due process right to an
unbiased decisionmaker.30 Such a possibility is forestalled, however,
by the APA's separation of functions requirements. Indeed, due
process concerns underlay Congress's decision to include these
provisions as well as other procedural protections for formal agency
adjudication in the APA. 31 Like the procedural process and First
2 7 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents ofFed. Bureau ofNarcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 396-97 (1971) (recognizing an implied private right of action for damages
against federal officers alleged to have violated constitutional rights).
28 See Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 551-53, 561-62 (2007) (emphasizing
availability of existing mechanisms for administrative and subsequent judicial
review and concluding that such availability, along with functional concerns, made
Bivens action inappropriate); Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 US. 61, 74
(2001) (noting respondents had full access to administrative remedy program in
refusing to infer Bivens action against private prison corporation); Schweiker v.
Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 424-25 (1988) (highlighting administrative review process
available to social security disability claimants, including option of seeking judicial
review once administrative remedies were exhausted, in refusing to imply a Bivens
action); Bush v. Lucas, 462 US. 367, 385-86 (1983) (concluding that
administrative system created by Congress "provides meaningful remedies for
employees who may have been unfairly disciplined for making critical comments
about their agencies" and refusing to create a Bivens action for alleged First
Amendment violations).
29 See 5 US.C.§§554, 556-557 (2006).
30 See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 US. 35, 46-55 (1975) (rejecting claim that
combination of investigative and adjudicatory functions necessarily violates due
process); see also In re Murchison, 349 US. 133, 139 (1955) (holding that
procedure under which judge charged witnesses with contempt, and also tried and
convicted them, violated due process).
" See William S. Jordan, III, Chevron and Hearing Rights: An Unintended
Combination, 61 Admin. L. Rev. 249, 299-312 (2009) (describing importance
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Amendment licensing decisions discussed above, constitutional
concerns are acknowledged to be in play in these contexts. But the
Court has not held these administrative mechanisms to be
constitutionally required, instead simply concluding they are
adequate to avoid constitutional violations. The result is that
governments enjoy greater discretion in shaping these administrative
mechanisms as they determine best.32
Ordinary administrative law can serve an even greater avoidance
role - not only guarding against recognized constitutional violations,
but also allowing courts to avoid addressing some constitutional
issues at all. Again, procedural due process provides a case in point.
The Court periodically insists that procedural due process imposes no
significant constraints on general policymaking. In doing so,
however, it relies on precedents going back to the beginning of the
twentieth century, before the advent of the modern administrative
state, in which rulemaking is pervasive and agencies exercise broad
discretion in devising requirements that can have a substantial impact
on identified groups.33 The Court has not had to address the question
placed on ensuring neutral decisionmakers and procedural protections in
development of APA formal adjudication requirements). See generally George B.
Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from
New Deal Politics, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1557 (1996) (detailing history behind
enactment of the APA).
32 This is particularly true in contrast to the First Amendment licensing
context, where the Court has imposed fairly specific procedural requirements. See
Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 133 (1992) ("The First
Amendment prohibits the vesting of... unbridled discretion in a government
official."). The Court is often quite deferential to governmental choices in assessing
procedural due process challenges. See, e.g., Walters v. Nat'lAss'n ofRadiation
Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 323-26 (1985) (emphasizing great weight due
government's desire to preserve informality and nonadversarial character of
veterans' benefits system).
33 The Court's decisions rejecting such procedural due process claims also
involved contexts in which substantial opportunity for notice and comment had
been provided. See, e.g., United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 243-
46 (1973) (invoking Londoner v. City ofDenver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908), and Bi-
Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. ofEqualization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915), and holding
procedural due process did not require additional rulemaking procedures where
agency's ultimate notice "could not have been more explicit or detailed" and
interested parties had sufficient time to object); see also Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. v. Natural Res. Def Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 542 n.16 (1978) (citing Bi-
Metallic and Florida East Coast and stating "since this was clearly a rulemaking
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of whether procedural due process requires some minimal level of
notice and opportunity to be heard with respect to regulatory
rulemaking in its modem form because the APA already mandates
such procedures.34 Similarly, Lisa Bressman has argued that the
availability of ordinary administrative law doctrines that prohibit
arbitrary agency decisionmaking has allowed the Court to avoid
determining whether the Constitution requires agencies to issue
standards to guide the exercise of their delegated powers.35
2. Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutionally Inspired. -
The description of ordinary administrative law as allowing courts to
avoid constitutional issues is only partially accurate. It fails to
capture the ways that constitutional concerns have shaped the
development of ordinary administrative law doctrines - sometimes
overtly, often tacitly. The emergence of hard look review of agency
decisionmaking exemplifies this phenomenon. The APA's prohibition
on arbitrary and capricious agency action today provides the basis for
at times quite searching judicial scrutiny. As the Court famously
stated in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co.: "The agency must examine the relevant
data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action[,]
including a 'rational connection between the facts found and the
choice made."' 36 Moreover, courts are instructed to set aside agency
proceeding in its purest form, we see nothing to support [the] view" that "additional
procedural devices were required under the Constitution," in regard to a rulemaking
in which the agency had provided detailed notice, including underlying staff
reports, and had held an oral hearing).
3 See 5 US. C. § 553 (outlining APA rulemaking procedures).
* See Bressman, Beyond Accountability, supra note 17, at 518 ("[The Court]
might ... refuse to ask agencies for the requisite standards under 'constitutional'
administrative law ... because reviewing courts could ask agencies for such
standards under 'ordinary' administrative law ... ."); Lisa Schultz Bressman,
Disciplining Delegation After Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 87 Cornell
L. Rev. 452, 459-66 (2002) ("Rules ofjudicial restraint support a shift from
constitutional law to administrative law to require administrative standards.").
36 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United
States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)). The recent Fox decision "rejects the notion that
all shifts in agency policy are subject to more rigorous judicial review," and
appears more willing than State Farm to allow agencies "to change their policies
due to changes in the political landscape." Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for
Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 Yale L. 2, 22 (2009). But Fox
did not call the general practice of hard look review into question. See FCC v. Fox
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action if they find an agency relied on factors which Congress has not
intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect
of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs
counter to the evidence before [it], or is so implausible that it could
not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency
expertise.37
It is generally accepted, at least by scholars, that "arbitrary and
capricious" review under State Farm is a far cry from the lenient
scrutiny originally intended by the Congress that enacted the APA.
When the APA was adopted, arbitrary and capricious was understood
to entail the same minimal scrutiny as constitutional rationality
review. Over the years, however, the courts came to read arbitrary
and capricious in an increasingly rigorous fashion until it came to
embody today's hard look review.38
Part of the explanation for this expansion of substantive judicial
scrutiny of agency decisionmaking lies in constitutional concerns
with broad delegations of power to agencies and the attendant risk of
unaccountable and arbitrary exercises of administrative power.
Intensified judicial scrutiny of administrative actions developed in
response to the dramatic expansion in regulatory authority that
accompanied enactment of major environmental, health and safety,
and consumer protection statutes during the 1960s and 1970s. This
period was also marked by increasing loss of faith in administrative
Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1810-11 (2009) (noting "the requirement
that an agency provide reasoned explanation for its action would ordinarily demand
that it display awareness that it is changing position" and insisting that rejection of
heightened scrutiny accords with State Farm).
11 State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43.
38 See Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Administrative Law in a Global Era: Progress,
Deregulatory Change, and the Rise of the Administrative Presidency, 73 Cornell L.
Rev. 1101, 1110 n.28, 1134-43 (1988) ("The 'arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of
discretion' standard was applied much like the reasonableness standard for
legislation ... . But ... the Court was willing, post-APA, to demand that an agency
provide reasons that justify its policy."); Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in
Historical Perspective, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 1189, 1300-15 (1986) (describing "judicial
activism" and "much closer scrutiny of agency decisions," which culminated in
"what Judge Harold Leventhal aptly labeled 'the hard look'). For an example of the
type of deferential scrutiny originally thought to be the measure of arbitrary and
capricious review, see Pac. Sts. Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 181-82
(1935) ("With the wisdom of such a regulation we have, of course, no concern. We
may enquire only whether it is arbitrary or capricious.").
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expertise and fears of agency capture by regulated interests. 9 The
requirement that agencies supply substantial, contemporaneous, and
reasoned explanations for their decisions exerts a powerful
disciplining force on the agency's decisionmaking process.40 In
particular, hard look review prioritizes expertise and technocratic
decisionmaking within the agency, in the process downplaying more
raw political considerations. 4 1 At the same time, requiring that
39 See Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72
Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1039, 1039-44, 1059-67 (1997) [hereinafter Merrill, Capture
Theory] ("Many federal judges became convinced that agencies were prone to
capture and related defects and - more importantly - that they were in a position to
do something about it."); Rabin, supra note 38, at 1295-315 (describing judicial
turn to close supervision in response to suspicions about agency good faith and
expertise combined with increasing scientific and technological complexity and
high-stakes rulemaking); see also Gillian E. Metzger, The Story of Vermont
Yankee: A Cautionary Tale of Judicial Review and Nuclear Waste, in
Administrative Law Stories 125, 143-48 (Peter L. Strauss ed., 2006) [hereinafter
Metzger, Vermont Yankee] (tracing D.C. Circuit's responses to concerns about
agency accountability presented by expanded rulemaking).
40 Some scholars say too disciplining. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw & David L.
Harfst, The Struggle for Auto Safety 224-28 (1990) ("The result ofjudicial
requirements for comprehensive rationality has been a general suppression of the
use of rules."); R. Shep Melnick, Regulation and the Courts: The Case of the Clean
Air Act 294-98 (1983) ("The practical effect of the courts' apparently evenhanded
procedures is far from politically neutral because their substantive pronouncements
severely limit the issues that intervenors can discuss."); Thomas 0. McGarity,
Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process, 41 Duke L.J 1385,
1387-96, 1400-03, 1419 (1992) (detailing adverse consequences of increasing
burdens and rigidities of informal rulemaking and identifying judicially imposed
analytic requirements as a major cause); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to
Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 Admin. L. Rev. 59, 60-62, 65-68 (1995) ("No
agency can perform [a regulatory] mission in today's legal environment."). For
more optimistic accounts of the benefits of hard look review, see William F.
Pedersen, Jr., Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 Yale L.J. 38, 59-60
(1975) (arguing "the effect of such detailed factual review by the courts on the
portion of the agency subject to it is entirely beneficial" and noting such review
"gives those who care about well-documented and well-reasoned decisionmaking a
lever with which to move those who do not"); Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing,
Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, 87 Cornell L. Rev.
486, 490-91, 522-26, 543-47 (2002) (drawing on psychology of decisionmaking to
argue arbitrary and capricious review may improve the overall quality of rules).
4 See Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From
Politics to Expertise, 2007 Sup. Ct. Rev. 54, 64-66, 87-88 (identifying hard look
review and reasoned decisionmaking requirements as serving an expertise forcing
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agencies explain and justify their actions also arguably reinforces
political controls by helping to ensure that Congress and the
President are aware of what agencies are doing.4 2
In short, this basic requirement of reasoned explanation is central
to alleviating core separation of powers concerns associated with the
administrative state.43 In his recent Fox concurrence, Justice Kennedy
noted this constitutional connection, describing the reasoned
decisionmaking requirement as "stemming from the administrative
agency's unique constitutional position" and the danger that "if
agencies were permitted unbridled discretion, their actions might
violate important constitutional principles of separation of powers
and checks and balances.""The Court implicitly made a similar link
function and reflecting a "vision of administrative law in which independence and
expertise are seen as opposed to, rather than defined by, political accountability");
Watts, supra note 36, at 19-20, 23-29 (characterizing current arbitrary and
capricious review as "representing the triumph of expertise to the exclusion of
politics" in administrative decisionmaking and detailing extent to which agencies
now generally fail to disclose political factors influencing decisionmaking).
42 See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law,
107 Colum. L. Rev. 1749, 1780-83 (2007) [hereinafter Bressman, Procedures]
("The reasoned decisionmaking requirement provides Congress ... with access to
information about agency action before such action is final."); Mathew D.
McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics
and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75
Va. L. Rev. 431, 441-43 (1989) ("Administrative procedures ... force the agency to
move slowly and publicly, giving politicians (informed by their constituents) time
to act before the status quo is changed."); Stack, supra note 23, at 958-59
(describing requirement that agency action be assessed solely on the agency's stated
reasons as "providing assurance that accountable agency decision-makers, not
merely courts and agency lawyers, have embraced the grounds for the agency's
actions").
43 See Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the
Fourth Branch: Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate Reasons
for Agency Decisions, 1987 Duke L.J. 387, 425-28 (detailing history of the reason-
giving requirement and its basis in separation of powers); see also Jerry L.
Mashaw, Reasoned Administration: The European Union, the United States, and
the Project of Democratic Governance, 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 99, 111 (2007)
(noting constitutional basis of reasoned decisionmaking requirement); Richard W.
Murphy, The Limits of Legislative Control Over the "Hard-Look," 56 Admin. L.
Rev. 1125, 1132-34 (2004) (same); Stack, supra note 23, at 992-1000 (describing
separation of powers justifications for nondelegation doctrine).
' FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1823 (2009)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see also Bowen v.
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in State Farm, emphasizing the difference between statutes and
administrative action and arguing that the latter did not merit the
same "presumption of constitutionality" and minimal rationality
review due the former. 45 Similarly, as Kevin Stack demonstrated in
his recent article on the landmark SEC v. Chenery decision, the
demand that agencies offer a contemporaneous statement of the
grounds for their actions derives from modem constitutional concerns
about delegation of authority to administrative agencies.46 The Court
made this connection express in opinions issued in the early decades
of the twentieth century, as the modern administrative state was
beginning to emerge, stating, "in creating such an administrative
agency the legislature, to prevent its being a pure delegation of
legislative power, must enjoin upon it a certain course of procedure
and certain rules of decision in the performance of its function."47
Today, however, the Court is less willing to acknowledge the
constitutional basis of the reasoned decisionmaking demand;
Kennedy's statement in Fox is quite unusual. Despite highlighting the
Am. Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610, 627 (1986) ("Our recognition of Congress' need to
vest administrative agencies with ample power to assist in the difficult task of
governing a vast and complex industrial Nation carries with it the correlative
responsibility of the agency to explain the rationale and factual basis for its
decision."). Jerry Mashaw has argued that the core administrative law notion that
"discretion is always conferred on administrators on the implicit assumption that it
will be reasonably exercised" is evident in an 1815 opinion by Chief Justice
Marshall in Otis v. Watkins, 13 US. (9 Cranch) 339, 358 (1815) (Marshall, C.J.,
separate opinion), although the Court itself rejected the requirement that a
government official must use "reasonable care in ascertaining the facts on which to
form an opinion," id. at 355-56 (majority opinion). Jerry L. Mashaw, Reluctant
Nationalists: Federal Administration and Administrative Law in the Republican
Era, 1801-1829, 116 Yale L.J 1636, 1677-78 (2007).
4 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 US. 29, 43
n.9 (1983).
46 Stack, supra note 23, at 982-89; cf. Ann Woolhandler, Delegation and Due
Process: The Historical Connection, 2008 Sup. Ct. Rev. 223, 225-26 (analyzing
effect of legislative delegation on procedural due process and arguing that the
Court initially imposed process requirements on delegees to ensure their
determinations had factual support, but "later supplemented, or in some cases
replaced, the requirement of process with a requirement - enforced by judicial
review - that the delegee's action not be substantively arbitrary").
47 Wichita R.R. & Light v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 260 U.S. 48, 58-59 (1922); see
also Stack, supra note 23, at 983-89 (discussing Wichita Railroad and similar
contemporaneous decisions).
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distinctive position of agencies, State Farm ultimately rooted hard
look review simply in the APA's prohibition on arbitrary and
capricious agency action, without addressing whether such intense
scrutiny was originally intended.48 Even more striking is the 2001
decision in Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns. The Court there
insisted that the constitutionality of a delegation turns solely on
whether Congress supplied an intelligible principle to guide the
agency and not on how the agency exercises its delegated power.49
Although the Court also indicated that what counts as a
constitutionally sufficient intelligible principle may vary with the
scope and nature of delegated responsibilities, unlike earlier
precedent it treated the presence of alternative checks, such as
agency-promulgated limits or even judicial oversight, as
irrelevant.50The constitutional forces that produced contemporary
48 State Farm, 463 U.S. at 41-43; see also Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,
Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971) (similarly invoking only the APA, though
with general references to the appropriate roles of courts and agencies). The Court's
refusal to address whether extensive substantive scrutiny accords with the
intentions of Congress in adopting the APA stands in particular contrast to its
insistence that courts not impose procedural controls beyond those in the APA. See
Metzger, Vermont Yankee, supra note 39, at 160-62 (discussing distinction between
procedure and substance in judicial review in aftermath of Vermont Yankee).
Compare Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def Council, Inc., 435
U.S. 519, 523-24, 543-44 (1978) (refusing to require additional procedures for
informal rulemaking beyond those specified in the APA), with id. at 549
(remanding for determination of whether decision was sustainable on the
administrative record).
49 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001). The specific issue in Whitman was whether an
agency's failure to adopt determinative guidelines to limit its discretion created an
unconstitutional delegation, but the Court's insistence that an agency's actions in
exercising its delegated authority are irrelevant to assessing the delegation's
constitutionality would presumably extend to denying the relevance of whether the
agency engaged in reasoned decisionmaking. Whitman does not, however, exclude
the possibility that the reasoned decisionmaking requirement is rooted in the Due
Process Clause.
o Id. at 475. The Court's refusal in Whitman to link judicial review to the
constitutionality of delegations was at odds with its opinion in INS v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919 (1983), which stated that "the bicameral process is not necessary as a
check on the Executive's administration of the laws because his administrative
activity cannot reach beyond the limits of the statute that created it" and
emphasized that "the courts, when a case or controversy arises, can always
'ascertain whether the will of Congress has been obeyed' and can enforce adherence
to statutory standards." Id at 953 n.16 (quoting Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S.
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arbitrary and capricious review have thus faded from immediate
view. Yet they nonetheless represent a fundamental basis on which
this basic administrative law doctrine rests.
The role that constitutional concerns play in inspiring ordinary
administrative law is even more evident in Chevron v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., which famously established the
rule that courts should defer to reasonable agency interpretations of
ambiguous statutes that the agencies are charged with
implementing.' Chevron creates a mechanism for checking agencies
somewhat different from hard look review, in that it emphasizes
political controls in addition to (some scholars argue more than)
agency reasoning and expertise.5 2 The Court's explanation in
414, 425 (1944), and citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
585 (1952)); see also Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen ofN. Am. v.
Connally, 337F. Supp. 737, 758 (D.D.C. 1971) ("Another feature that blunts the
'blank check' rhetoric is the requirement that any action taken by the Executive
under the law ... be in accordance with further standards as developed by the
Executive."); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power
in the Administrative State, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 452, 485-88 (1989) (detailing shift
in delegation doctrine between a focus on "power divided to power kept in check").
5' 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). More specifically, Chevron famously established
that courts are instructed to undertake a two-step inquiry in assessing agency
statutory interpretations. At the first step, the court asks whether the statute's plain
terms "directly address[] the precise question at issue." Id. If the statute is
ambiguous on the point, the court defers at step two to the agency's interpretation
so long as the construction is "a reasonable policy choice for the agency to make."
Id. at 845. Subsequent decisions have made clear that a court must initially
establish that "Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules
carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was
promulgated in the exercise of that authority" for Chevron deference to apply - a
requirement occasionally referred to as Chevron's step zero. United States v. Mead
Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001).
52 See Bressman, Procedures, supra note 42, at 1763-65 ("Chevron, more than
any other case, is responsible for anchoring the presidential control model ...
recognizing that politics is a permissible basis for agency policymaking."); Watts,
supra note 36, at 35-38 ("Chevron underscored the relevance of political influences
... to agencies' interpretive processes."). But see Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or "The
Decider"? The President in Administrative Law, 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 696, 752
(2006) ("While Chevron sensibly accepts the President's political role as mediating
the difficulties of focused bureaucratic expertise, it does not purport to displace
reliance on the latter... . Not a word in Chevron suggests tolerance for the
proposition that [a] decision could be made by anyone but the administrator of the
EPA ... .").
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Chevron for this deference rule was cursory, but it suggested that one
basis was congressional intent, arguing that in delegating
implementation to an agency Congress was also implicitly delegating
gap-filling interpretive authority.53 Yet such an across-the-board
implication of congressional intent is, of course, purely fictional.54
The real question is why read statutory delegations as including
implicit delegation of interpretive authority, rather than insist that
courts exercise independent judgment on questions of statutory
meaning absent express instructions from Congress to the contrary.
The Court appears to have been influenced both by separation of
powers and institutional competency concerns about the appropriate
judicial role, combined with recognition of the impossibility of
separating questions of statutory meaning from questions of policy.5
Later in the opinion the Court acknowledged this constitutional basis
for its approach, emphasizing the impropriety of judges making
policy decisions as well as the need to leave such determinations to
467 U.S. at 844.
5 See David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron's Nondelegation Doctrine,
2001 Sup. Ct. Rev. 201, 212-20 ("Because Congress so rarely makes its intentions
about deference clear, Chevron doctrine at most can rely on a fictionalized
statement of legislative desire, which in the end must rest on the Court's view of
how best to allocate interpretive authority."). Indeed, the Chevron Court appeared
to acknowledge as much. See 467 U.S. at 865 (describing several possible accounts
of why Congress adopted the statutory language it did, and stating "for judicial
purposes, it matters not which of these things occurred").
1s See, e.g., Farina, supra note 50, at 456 ("Chevron invoked the principles of
separation of powers and legitimacy."); Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the
Paradox of Deference: A Preliminary Inquiry into Agency Statutory Interpretation,
57 Admin. L. Rev. 501, 505 (2005) [hereinafter Mashaw, Norms, Practices]
("Chevron relies on constitutional structure, Congress's legitimate authority to
delegate lawmaking power ... and [agencies'] political accountability ... .").
Although most agree that constitutional concerns were one basis for Chevron, the
extent to which Chevron's deference rule can be constitutionally justified has
sparked some controversy. Compare Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman,
Chevron's Domain, 89 Geo. L.J. 833, 864-67, 870-73 (2001) (expressing doubt
about constitutional basis of Chevron deference and rooting it instead in presumed
congressional intent), with Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Reconciling Chevron and Stare
Decisis, 85 Geo. L.1 2225, 2227 (1997) (defending Chevron as constitutionally
based), and Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration after Chevron, 90 Colum. L.
Rev. 2071, 2086-91 (1990) (doubting separation of powers or congressional intent
can justify Chevron and arguing instead that institutional competency concerns
provide a plausible justification).
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officials politically accountable through the President: "The
responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of ... policy choices and
resolving the struggle between competing views of the public interest
are not judicial ones: 'Our Constitution vests such responsibilities in
the political branches.'"6'
Constitutional values also surface expressly when the Court
invokes constitutional canons of interpretation in reading
administrative statutes.5 For example, the Court has applied a
"strong presumption that Congress intends judicial review of
administrative action," a presumption rooted in both due process and
separation of powers concerns.5 8Just last term, in Wyeth v. Levine,
the Court relied in part on the federalism-inspired presumption
against preemption in refusing to defer to the Food and Drug
Administration's (FDA's) view that a state law failure to warn suit
was preempted by the FDA's approval of the drug label at issue.59
51 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866 (quoting Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153,
195 (1978)); see also id. at 865 ("An agency to which Congress has delegated
policymaking responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation, properly
rely upon the incumbent administration's views of wise policy ... . While agencies
are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is ... .").
* On the role of the canons and constitutional values in interpreting regulatory
statutes, see Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103
Harv. L. Rev. 405, 459, 469-74 (1989) [hereinafter Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes]
("Interpretive principles are often a product of constitutional norms."); see also
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U Pa. L.
Rev. 1007, 1019-36 (1989) (discussing role of constitutional values in statutory
interpretation generally, not limited to administrative contexts); Jonathan R. Siegel,
Textualism and Contextualism in Administrative Law, 78 B. U. L. Rev. 1023, 1024,
1032-79 (1998) (arguing background normative principles are central to
interpretation of administrative law statutes, though not linking these principles to
specifically constitutional concerns).
" Bowen v. Mich. Acad. ofFamily Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986); see
also Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967) (discussing strong
presumption ofjudicial reviewability).
' 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1194-95, 1198, 1200-02 (2009). In like fashion, the
constitutional avoidance canon in particular is sometimes identified as a basis for
denying the deference usually accorded reasonable agency statutory interpretations
of ambiguous statutes under Chevron. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 US. 173, 190-91
(1991) (acknowledging the Court's practice of, if possible, avoiding statutory
interpretations that raise grave constitutional doubts, but concluding agency
regulations at issue did not raise such doubts and thus canon did not prevent
deference to Secretary's reasonable interpretation).
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Indeed, the Court has identified federalism concerns as supporting
narrower interpretations of the scope of an agency's delegated
authority or more aggressive statutory readings under step one of
Chevron even when the constitutional canons are not in
play.6 0Several scholars have argued that nondelegation and other
constitutional concerns underlie other notably narrow interpretations
of administrative statutes, though the Court has often been less open
about the constitutional basis of these decisions.6'
3. Encouraging Administrative Constitutionalism. - The third
connection between ordinary administrative law and constitutional
law is significantly different. Rather than involving judicial
assessment of constitutional requirements or judicial development of
administrative law doctrines to respond to constitutional concerns,
the approach here centers on encouraging agencies to take
constitutional values and concerns into account in their
decisionmaking. The goal of such administrative constitutionalism is
not simply avoiding judicial invalidation of unconstitutional agency
actions, but fostering a more affirmative and independent agency role
in implementing constitutional requirements. This version of the
' See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 269-75 (2006) (emphasizing
federalism concerns raised by Attorney General's interpretation of Controlled
Substances Act but concluding it was not necessary to employ a clear statement
rule or presumption against preemption to find the interpretation invalid); Gillian E.
Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 Duke L.J. 2023, 2032-36,
2063-69 (2008) [hereinafter Metzger, New Federalism] (providing examples where
the Court used "fairly exacting scrutiny ... [and] its doing so appears driven in large
part by federalism concerns").
61 See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 US. 120, 160
(2000) (refusing to read the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act as authorizing FDA
regulation of tobacco, noting in part the substantial expansion in agency power that
would result and stating Congress would not delegate "in so cryptic a fashion"); see
also John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000
Sup. Ct. Rev. 223, 227 [hereinafter Manning, Nondelegation] (characterizing
Brown & Williamson as animated by nondelegation concerns); Hiroshi Motomura,
Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional
Norms and Constitutional Interpretation, 100 Yale L.J. 545, 564-75, 580-600
(1990) (arguing that "phantom constitutional norms" - norms rooted in due process,
equal protection, and the First Amendment, but fundamentally at odds with plenary
power doctrine - underlie many immigration decisions); Cass R. Sunstein,
Nondelegation Canons, 67 U Chi. L. Rev. 315, 316 (2000) [hereinafter Sunstein,
Nondelegation] (identifying a number of canons of statutory interpretation as
motivated by nondelegation concerns).
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constitutional law-administrative law interplay is the one curtly
dismissed in Fox, and on other occasions as well the Court has
displayed ambivalence about encouraging such administrative
constitutionalism. Nonetheless, this linkage between constitutional
law and administrative decisionmaking surfaces with some regularity
in judicial decisions, and it is often fostered by political branch
enactments.
A recent illustration came in Wyeth, issued just a month before
Fox. In the course of holding that courts ultimately have the power to
decide when preemption exists, absent a delegation to agencies of
power to preempt, the Court emphasized that it often gives "some
weight" to an agency determination that state law would pose
obstacles to a federal regulatory scheme.62 According to the Court,
the weight actually given to "the agency's explanation of state law's
impact on the federal scheme depends on its thoroughness,
consistency, and persuasiveness." 63 The Court then refused to defer
to the FDA's opinion that its approval of a prescription drug label
preempted state law failure to warn claims, noting the FDA had
"reversed [its] own longstanding position without providing a
reasoned explanation" and done so through a process that failed to
offer "states or other interested parties notice or opportunity for
comment."' Wyeth's net effect is to give agencies a clear incentive
to take federalism concerns raised by preemption seriously, solicit
comments from affected governments, and carefully justify any
conclusion that state law would be an impediment to a federal
regulatory scheme.
Another recent decision displaying this type of connection
between constitutional law and administrative decisionmaking is
Boumediene v. Bush.65 In a 5-4 decision, the Court there held that the
Military Commissions Act's restrictions on the ability of Guantanamo
Bay detainees to challenge their detention through habeas corpus
constituted a violation of the Suspension Clause.66 In so holding,
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion underscored procedural
62 Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1200-01.
61 Id. at 1201.
64 Id.
61 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
66 Id. at 2240.
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deficiencies with the government's internal administrative
proceedings, the combatant status review tribunals (CSRTs), and
repeatedly suggested that use of more robust internal procedural
protections could lead to a different result. According to the Court,
"the adequacy of the process through which [a detainee's] status
determination was made" is a relevant factor "in determining the
reach of the Suspension Clause." 67 In addition, the Court emphasized
that, in determining whether alternative procedures provide an
adequate substitute for habeas, "what matters is the sum total of
procedural protections afforded to the detainee at all stages, direct
and collateral." 68 Again, the effect is to give the government an
incentive to craft internal administrative procedures that address the
constitutional weakness the majority identified in the current system,
specifically the detainees' limited ability to challenge the factual basis
on which they are being held as enemy combatants, in order to limit
the scope of subsequent judicial review. 6 9
Decisions applying the constitutional avoidance canon to
agency-administered statutes create similar incentives for agencies to
take constitutional concerns seriously.70 Concern that a reviewing
court may invoke the canon in lieu of Chevron deference may lead an
agency to forgo broad assertions of authority or interpretations of
ambiguous statutes that tread close to the constitutional pale. True,
the agency thereby cedes some power it might prefer to preserve, but
it forestalls an independent judicial determination of statutory
meaning that could more significantly impinge on its authority.7 1 The
67 Id. at 2259.
68 Id. at 2269; see also id. at 2268 ("The necessary scope of habeas review in
part depends upon the rigor of any earlier proceedings.").
69 The Obama administration initially appeared headed in this direction. See
David Johnston, In Senate, Debate on Detainee Legal Rights, N.Y. Times, Jul. 8,
2009, at A 18 ("Obama administration lawyers said ... that detainees prosecuted by
military commissions should have some of the same constitutional rights as
American citizens tried in civilian criminal courts.").
7o See Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch,
106 Colum. L. Rev. 1189, 1197 (2006) (discussing agency incentives to apply the
constitutional avoidance canon in the face of likely judicial review).
n In Rapanos v. United States, Chief Justice Roberts noted this point in
castigating the Army Corps of Engineers and the EPA for failing to respond to a
prior Supreme Court decision that had invoked constitutional concerns as grounds
for refusing to defer to an agency interpretation of the Clean Water Act's (CWA 's)
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immigration context provides a contemporary example of this
dynamic. In Zadvydas v. Davis, the Court invalidated the
government's interpretation of a federal immigration statute as
authorizing indefinite detention of aliens ordered removable. The
Court invoked the canon of constitutional avoidance as support for
reading the statutes as authorizing only the detention of such aliens
for a period reasonably necessary to secure their removal.72 In
response, the government promulgated a new interpretation of the
governing statute, one that preserved its authority to indefinitely
detain some aliens but significantly narrowed the categories of aliens
over which it could exercise such authority. The government argued
in subsequent court challenges that its new regulation avoided the
constitutional problems with its prior approach and therefore
qualified for Chevron deference.7 3
Decisions like Wyeth, Boumediene, and Zadvydas signal the
important role that administrative agencies play in ensuring that
constitutional requirements are met. Initial responsibility for
scope. See 547 U.S. 715, 758 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (arguing that given
the "generous leeway [afforded agencies] in interpreting the statutes they are
entrusted to administer," and the "broad, somewhat ambiguous, but nonetheless
clearly limiting terms" of the CWA, "the Corps and the EPA would have enjoyed
plenty of room to operate in developing some notion of an outer bound to the reach
of their authority").
72 533 U.S. 678, 682 (2001) (construing statute to contain reasonable time
limitation to avoid raising "serious constitutional concerns"); see also Clark v.
Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 379 (2005) (holding the statutory interpretation of
Zadvydas applies to aliens ordered removed who are inadmissible under the
governing statute).
" See 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(a) (2009) (allowing detention of "particular
removable aliens" on the basis of "special circumstances" but exempting "aliens
who are not subject to the special review provisions under § 241.13"); see also
Continued Detention of Aliens Subject to Final Orders of Removal, 66 Fed. Reg.
56,967, 56,967 (Nov. 14, 2001); BriefFor Appellants at 15-26, Hernandez-
Carrera v. Carlson, 547 F.3d 1237 (10th Cir. 2008) (No. 08-3097). A circuit split
currently exists on the question of whether the government's new regulation
qualifies for Chevron deference. Compare Carlson, 547 F.3d at 1245-56, cert.
denied, 175 L. Ed 2d 620 (2009) (holding the new interpretation does not raise
serious constitutional doubts and that Chevron deference is appropriate), with Tran
v. Mukasey, 515 F.3d 478, 484 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding deference inappropriate).
See also Kenneth A. Bamberger, Normative Canons in the Review of
Administrative Policymaking, 118 Yale L.J. 64, 76-84 (2008) (describing case law
on relationship between the constitutional canons and Chevron deference).
30-2
Fall 2010 Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law
addressing constitutional questions frequently falls to agencies.
Moreover, although their decisions are subject to judicial scrutiny,
agencies nonetheless are able to exert substantial influence in setting
administrative policies or procedures that can have substantial
constitutional import. Recognition of their ability to limit subsequent
judicial interventions on constitutional grounds can be a powerful
mechanism for encouraging agencies to take constitutional concerns
seriously.
Interestingly, however, the Court rarely discusses this
incentivizing effect. Wyeth and Boumediene are as express as it gets,
and even in those cases the Court spoke somewhat indirectly,
emphasizing that better agency decisionmaking and procedures might
result in greater deference or avoidance of judicially imposed
remedies rather than directly urging agencies to take constitutional
concerns more seriously. Similarly, the Court rarely overtly
acknowledges the incentives created by its constitutional canon
decisions or its decisions holding that administrative protections can
satisfy constitutional individual rights requirements. Indeed, in some
contexts - the Fourth Amendment in particular - the Court has been
notably reluctant to tie satisfaction of constitutional requirements to
use of administrative measures in a way that would incentivize
adoption of the latter.74 This is true even though the Court has
implicitly linked these two and acknowledged the potential
constitutional benefits of administrative measures that limit police
officer discretion.7 ' Administrative constitutionalism is further
74 See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 815 (1996) (rejecting Fourth
Amendment claim even though police officer's stop of automobile did not conform
to governing police regulations); David A. Sklansky, Quasi-Affirmative Rights in
Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 88 Va. L. Rev. 1229, 12 75-76 & nn. 161-163
(2002) ("Outside [certain] narrow doctrinal categories, the Supreme Court has
made clear that 'reasonableness' under the Fourth Amendment does not depend on
either the promulgation or the observance of internal regulations by the police.").
s For implicit linkages, see, e.g., Mich. Dep't ofState Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S.
444, 454 (1990) (noting random stops involve the type of unconstrained discretion
the Court has ruled must be circumscribed); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691,
702-03 (1987) (upholding warrantless administrative inspections of closely
regulated industries only if, among other factors, the discretion of inspecting
officers is limited); see also Wayne R. LaFave, Controlling Discretion by
Administrative Regulations: The Use, Misuse, and Nonuse of Police Rules and
Policies in Fourth Amendment Adjudication, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 442, 445 (1990)
("The Court has sometimes expressly recognized that limits upon [police]
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discouraged by doctrines excusing constitutional challenges from the
usual exhaustion requirements, as well as by the standard rule that the
"adjudication of the constitutionality of congressional enactments has
generally been thought beyond the jurisdiction of administrative
agencies." 6
Of greater relevance here, to the extent the Court has sought to
encourage agencies to consider constitutional concerns, it has
generally done so outside of ordinary administrative law doctrines
and direct administrative review. Although Wyeth involved the
question of how much deference to accord to an agency's
interpretation of a statute as preemptive, it involved claims of
preemption raised in a state tort suit and was not a direct challenge to
administrative action.77 Boumediene was a constitutional challenge,
discretion are essential to the protection of Fourth Amendment values."); Sklansky,
supra note 74, at 1275-76 & nn.161-163 (listing examples). Academic
commentators have long advocated reading the Fourth Amendment to require
administrative rulemaking, and the Court supported the idea in dicta in United
States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 755 (1979) ("Regulations governing the conduct of
criminal investigations are generally considered desirable ... ."). See generally,
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev.
349, 415-28 (1974) (arguing in favor of "legal directives that confine police
discretion within reasonable bounds"); LaFave, supra, at 447-51 (discussing
"system of rulemaking by law enforcement agencies" as way of cabining police
discretion).
76 Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 215 (1994) (alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court's statements in this context
have been somewhat ambivalent, as it has also emphasized that exhaustion "is not
mandatory," id., and at times has urged the advantages of "providing the agency the
opportunity to reconsider its policies, interpretations, and regulations in light of...
challenges," including constitutional claims, Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term
Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 24 (2000).
n See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 883-86 (2000)
(stating, in context of state tort suit, that Department of Transportation's position
that a federal regulatory standard preempted state tort action at issue should be
accorded "some weight," but holding deference unnecessary to conclude that
preemption was appropriate); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 495-96 (1996)
(stating, in context of state tort suit, that Court's determination that a statute did not
preempt state tort claims was "substantially informed" by federal regulations and
that the implementing agency's views of the statute should be given "substantial
weight"); see also Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 US. 1, 20-21 & n. 13
(2007) (holding, in context of preemption declaratory judgment action, that federal
statute clearly preempted state action at issue and thus the Court had no need to
reach question of deference due federal agency's preemption determination).
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alleging that executive action had violated the Habeas Clause, rather
than an administrative law challenge. Yet another example is the
Court's indication that application of the constitutional canons trumps
ordinary administrative law deference doctrines." I have argued
elsewhere that in recent decisions the Court has appeared to use
administrative law as a mechanism for vindicating constitutional
federalism concerns,7 9 but these moves are largely implicit and rarely
acknowledged by the Court.so Thus, as the Fox majority insisted, the
78 See, e.g., Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504,
2513-17 (2009) (applying canon of constitutional avoidance and rejecting
implementing agency's interpretation of Voting Rights Act without invoking
deference); see also Bamberger, supra note 73, at 77-78 (describing the Court's
position on relationship between the canon of constitutional avoidance and
Chevron deference).
7 In several instances - including Watters, 550 U.S. at 20-21, Massachusetts v.
EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528 (2007), and Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 258 (2006)
- the Court used aggressive Chevron step zero or step one inquiries to avoid
troubling federalism issues raised by federal agency preemption of state law. The
Court has also been more willing to defer to agency action when the record
indicates that an agency has been sensitive to the federalism implications of its
actions. In a prior article, I described these moves by the Court as involving use of
both ordinary and extraordinary administrative law to address federalism concerns,
with extraordinary administrative law consisting of instances in which federalism
concerns led the Court to differ in its application of ordinary or standard
administrative law doctrines. See Metzger, New Federalism, supra note 60, at 2062,
2064-65. To avoid confusion, it is worth noting that here I am using the term
"ordinary administrative law" somewhat differently, as meaning administrative law
requirements and doctrines generally thought to be nonconstitutional, see supra text
accompanying notes 15-17, and thus as encompassing both ordinary and
extraordinary administrative law as I previously used these terms.
so See Metzger, New Federalism, supra note 60, at 2054-55, 2059-60
("Whether or not the Court perceives administrative law as serving a federalism
function, it is at least approaching these cases in a manner that allows
administrative law to play such a role."). The Court has been more overt about this
connection in the past, much as it was previously more open about the
constitutional bases of reasoned decisionmaking. See, e.g., Florida v. United
States, 282 U.S. 194, 211-12 (1931) ("Whenever the federal power is exerted
within what would otherwise be the domain of state power, the justification of the
exercise of the federal power must clearly appear... . [If] the Commission
undertakes to prescribe a statewide level of intrastate rates in order to avoid an
undue burden, from a revenue standpoint, upon the interstate carrier, there should
be appropriate findings upon evidence ... ." (citations omitted)). Notably, one recent
occasion in which the Court did acknowledge that federalism concerns affected its
analysis - the discussion of state standing in Massachusetts, 549 US. at 518-21 -
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Court does not appear to have expressly employed ordinary
administrative doctrines, in particular arbitrary and capricious
review, to force agencies to consider the significant constitutional
implications of their actions. Nonetheless, the incentives for agencies
to address constitutional concerns administratively remain present,
even if ordinary administrative law is not usually the mechanism by
which such incentives are created.
The Court's failure to encourage administrative constitutionalism
through ordinary administrative law contrasts markedly with the
approach taken by the political branches. Congress and the President
frequently impose statutory and regulatory restrictions on
administrative decisionmaking that reflect their desire for agencies to
attend to constitutional concerns. Such restrictions are particularly
prevalent in the federalism context: Congress often requires agencies
to consult with states before taking certain actions and to justify the
imposition of particularly costly rules on states.8 ' The President has
long sought, through executive orders, "to ensure that the principles
of federalism established by the Framers guide the executive
departments and agencies in the formulation and implementation of
policies." 82 The latest example of such federalism concerns is
President Obama's recent memorandum imposing limits on when
agencies can act to preempt state laws.8 3 Yet these statutory and
regulatory demands that agencies consider constitutional values are
not limited to federalism principles; they also surface in conjunction
with individual rights. A notable example involves limitations on
involved application of constitutional jurisdictional requirements rather than
ordinary administrative law.
81 See, e.g., Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA)§§201-202,
205, 2 U.S.C.§§1531-1532, 1535 (2006) (stating "each agency shall ... assess the
effects of Federal regulatory actions on State, local, and tribal governments" and
"identify and consider a reasonable number of regulatory alternatives," selecting
the "least costly"); Metzger, New Federalism, supra note 60, at 2056-57 (arguing
that Congress, in addition to the Court, has emphasized "administrative procedure
as a means of ensuring federal agencies consider state interests").
82 Exec. Order No. 13,132, 3 C.F.R. 206 (1999), reprinted in 5 US.C § 601
(2006). Executive Order 13,132 replaced an earlier executive order promulgated by
President Reagan, Exec. Order No. 12,612, 3 C.F.R. 252 (1987), which similarly
sought to ensure agencies paid attention to federalism principles and required
assessment of the federalism impact of proposed agency actions.
83 Presidential Memorandum of May 20, 2009, 74 Fed. Reg. 24,693 (May 20,
2009).
30-2
Fall 2010 Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law
federal funds. A number of agencies have developed regulations to
implement statutory prohibitions on federal funds being used in a
racially discriminatory or otherwise constitutionally troubling
fashion. 84 A contemporary instance is the Office of Management and
Budget's (OMB's) guidance on the use of federal stimulus funds,
which provides that agencies must ensure grant recipients comply
with federal antidiscrimination statutes and program requirements.85
A second point worth noting is simply the reality that
administrative constitutionalism occurs. This point is most frequently
made in regard to the work of the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) and
the Solicitor General, whose official responsibilities include
analyzing constitutional issues arising in proposed legislation, agency
actions, and litigation.86 Though these agencies are no doubt the most
I See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. § 100 (2008) (effectuating Title VI with respect to
program or activity receiving financial assistance from Department of Education);
45 C.F.R. § 80 (2008) (implementing same policy for Department of Health and
Human Services). Similarly, agencies have adopted regulations to ensure equal
treatment of faith-based organizations. For example, in Zobrest v. Catalina
Foothills School District, the Supreme Court considered 34 C.F.R. § 76.532(a)(1)
(1992), which it explained "implements the Secretary of Education's understanding
of (and thus is coextensive with) the requirements of the Establishment Clause."
509 U.S. 1, 6 n. 7 (1993). Today, many such regulations provide for equal treatment
of religious organizations. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 87.1(b) (2008) ("Religious
organizations are eligible, on the same basis as any other organization, to
participate in any Department program for which they are otherwise eligible."). A
particularly interesting example is the Internal Revenue Service's interpretation of
the tax code as prohibiting tax-exempt status for private schools that racially
discriminated in admissions. See Olati Johnson, The Story of Bob Jones University
v. United States: Race, Religion, and Congress' Extraordinary Acquiescence, in
Statutory Interpretation Stories (Elizabeth Garrett et al. eds., forthcoming 2010)
(manuscript at 1-3, on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing
development of tax-exempt prohibition).
85 Peter Orszag, Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Memorandum for the Heads
of Departments and Agencies, Initial Implementing Guidance for the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Feb. 18. 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/memoranda fy2009/m09-10.pdf (on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
86 See Dawn E. Johnsen, Faithfully Executing the Laws: Internal Legal
Constraints on Executive Power, 54 UCLA L. Rev. 1559, 1576-601 (2007)
(analyzing OLC's role and critically assessing its approach to national security
issues under the Bush administration); Morrison, supra note 70, at 1218-20
(discussing OLC's approach to constitutional avoidance); Cornelia T.L. Pillard, The
Unfulfilled Potential of the Constitution in Executive Hands, 103 Mich. L. Rev.
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attuned to constitutional issues, they are not the sole location for
constitutional interpretation within the executive branch. Scholars are
beginning to document a number of instances in which other
administrative agencies were at the forefront of developing new
understandings of constitutional rights. William Eskridge and John
Ferejohn, for example, have described how officials at the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) developed the view
that pregnancy discrimination was sex discrimination.87 Sophia Lee
has offered an account of the role that constitutional arguments
played in the emergence of licensee equal employment and
nondiscrimination requirements at the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) and other federal agencies.8 8 Like Eskridge and
Ferejohn, Lee emphasizes the extent to which "administrative
constitutionalism" - defined as "regulatory agencies' independent
interpretation and implementation of constitutional law" - is "a
recurring aspect of the modem American state." 89 Anuj Desai has
traced the development of the idea of communications privacy, now
an established Fourth Amendment principle, to early decisions and
practice within the post office.90 Law enforcement agencies provide
further instances of administrative attention to constitutional
requirements, with a notable example being the Department of
Justice's U.S. Attorneys' Manual, which mandates disclosure policies
for U.S. Attorneys' Offices in order to ensure compliance with the
constitutional requirement that prosecutors disclose exculpatory
evidence to defendants. 91 Indeed, administrative constitutional
676, 702-17, 740-41 (2005) (describing the work of OLC and the Solicitor General
and their effect on constitutional interpretation elsewhere in the executive branch).
8 See William N. Eskridge & John Ferejohn, American Constitutionalism: A
Republic of Statutes (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript ch. 1, at I1-12, on file with
the Columbia Law Review).
" Sophia Z. Lee, Race, Sex, and Rulemaking: Administrative
Constitutionalism and the Workplace, 1960 to the Present, 96 Va. L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 12-63, on file with the Columbia Law Review).
For examples of the FCC's attention to constitutional concerns, see id. at 16-29.
89 Id. at 3, 5.
90 Anuj C. Desai, Wiretapping Before the Wires: The Post Office and the Birth
of Communications Privacy, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 553, 568-84 (2007).
9 See Dep't of Justice, U.S. Attorneys' Manual, Title 9: Criminal Resource
Manual § 5.001 (2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia reading
room/usam/title9/5mcrm.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (stating a
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interpretation arguably occurs whenever government employees take
actions that have potential constitutional significance - in short, all
the time.92
B. The Constitutional Common Law Character of Ordinary
Administrative Law
Several features of the appearances of constitutional law in
administrative contexts merit particular emphasis and support the
characterization of ordinary administrative law as an instance of
constitutional common law. One is the largely indeterminate
character of constitutional law when it surfaces. In some instances,
such as the First Amendment licensing context, constitutional
demands on administrative law are judicially specified with relative
clarity. More commonly, however, the Court invokes general
constitutional norms or standards and the scope of specific
constitutional requirements remains uncertain. This indeterminacy is
evident in procedural due process, given the Mathews v. Eldridge
case-by-case balancing analysis and the fact that statutory and
regulatory procedural protections often obviate the need for courts to
determine the precise contours of procedural due process in
administrative contexts.93 Such indeterminacy is especially true,
policy to "ensure timely disclosure of an appropriate scope of exculpatory and
impeachment information"); Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of
Prosecutors, 79 N. C. L. Rev. 721, 762-63 (2001) (discussing internal office
supervision, including agency manuals, as mechanism for controlling prosecutorial
misconduct). On the whole, however, law enforcement agencies have been slow to
adopt meaningful administrative constraints to guard against constitutional
violations. See Sklansky, supra note 74, at 1272-73 (noting that development of
guidelines limiting police discretion has been "sporadic, crisis-driven, and
limited"); see also Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in
Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 551,
661-62 (1997) (noting areas in which police guidelines have been adopted and
continued resistance to such administrative approaches).
92 See David A. Strauss, Presidential Interpretation of the Constitution, 15
Cardozo L. Rev. 113, 114 (1993) [hereinafter Strauss, Presidential Interpretation]
(noting the executive branch often must engage in constitutional interpretation to
determine limits of its everyday authority).
" Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976); see supra text
accompanying notes 24-26 (discussing procedures used for administrative hearings
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however, of separation of powers and federalism principles invoked
by courts or the political branches to justify ordinary administrative
law doctrines and decisions. Little doubt exists, for example, that
under existing case law courts do not violate either Article I or
Article III when they interpret ambiguous statutes, that Congress
could delegate broad power to administrative agencies to regulate
major economic sectors without closely detailed guidance, or that
Congress could preempt broad swaths of state law through regulatory
statutes. As a result, doctrines such as Chevron and insistence on
clear congressional authorization of broad delegations or preemptive
effect are hard to categorize as constitutionally mandated. 94 Instead,
they are best described as constitutionally inspired requirements that
reflect these general constitutional principles, while the exact nature
of their constitutional underpinnings remains unspecified.
This indeterminate character is reinforced by the tacit quality of
much constitutionalism in administrative law. As noted above, the
Court rarely discusses the constitutional underpinnings of ordinary
administrative law doctrines in any detail, and today often makes no
reference whatsoever to the constitutional dimensions of its
administrative law decisions. 95 Why the Court is so reluctant to
acknowledge the role played by constitutional concerns in the
development of ordinary administrative law is somewhat of a puzzle.
Resistance to openly acknowledging constitutional indeterminacy is
and constraints on discretion in administrative licensing and prior restraint regimes
that affect First Amendment rights).
94 See Barron & Kagan, supra note 54, at 215 ("Congress has ultimate
authority over whether and when Chevron deference should operate."); Merrill &
Hickman, supra note 55, at 866-67, 915 ("Chevron does not suggest that the
nondelegation doctrine or any other principle of separation of powers compels this
outcome."); Metzger, New Federalism, supra note 60, at 2048-52 (discussing
Congress's wide regulatory authority under current doctrine and noting Court's
failure to invoke express federalism curbs in recent cases involving agency-
administered statutes). Indeed, some scholars have argued that the Chevron
doctrine is in fact constitutionally suspect. See Farina, supra note 50, at 487-98
(arguing Chevron deference in fact raises separation of powers concerns and is at
odds with history of delegation doctrine); Jonathan T. Molot, The Judicial
Perspective in the Administrative State: Reconciling Modem Doctrines of
Deference with the Judiciary's Structural Role, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 73-75 (2000)
(arguing Chevron deference undermines the structural constitutional role originally
assigned the judiciary).
* See supra text accompanying notes 18, 23, 48-50
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not ultimately a plausible explanation, given the extent to which the
Court has embraced such indeterminacy in other aspects of
constitutional analysis and in its application of the constitutional
canons, a point discussed further below.9 6 A more likely cause is the
Court's increased resistance to independent federal court lawmaking,
a resistance also evident in the decline of implied rights of action and
curtailment of federal common law." No doubt the Court's greater
insistence on judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation is
also playing a role. Administrative law decisions are replete with
references to Congress's ability to control - and in particular reduce -
the substantive and procedural requirements that govern agency
action. 98 From a judicial supremacy perspective, such congressional
authority is difficult to square with an understanding of ordinary
administrative law as having a constitutional component. Whatever
the cause, the effect of the Court's refusal to openly acknowledge the
role constitutional concerns play in fashioning administrative law is
to leave the scope of the constitutional core of ordinary
administrative law unclear.
An additional factor that obscures the boundaries between
constitutional law and ordinary administrative law is the occasional
reciprocal nature of their relationship. Not only do constitutional
concerns underlay much ordinary administrative law, but ordinary
96 See infra text accompanying notes 146-150.
97 See supra text accompanying notes 9-11; see also Alexander v. Sandoval,
532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001) (limiting implied right of action); Semtek Int'l, Inc. v.
Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 508 (2001) (applying federal common law,
but finding claim preclusion "classic case for adopting, as the federally prescribed
rule of decision, the law that would be applied by state courts in the State in which
the federal diversity court sits"); Paul Lund, The Decline of Federal Common Law,
76 B. U. L. Rev. 895, 899 (1996) (arguing the Court has restricted federal common
lawmaking power by holding, contrary to prior case law, that "state law rather than
federal common law governs certain issues," and by "requiring federal courts to
incorporate state law rules as federal law even when federal common law"
governs).
9 See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def Council, Inc., 435
U.S. 519, 523-24, 548 (1976) (emphasizing that the APA represented the maximum
procedural requirements "Congress was willing to have courts impose upon
agencies in conducting rulemaking procedures" and castigating additional judicial
procedural impositions as illegitimately "interfering with the process prescribed by
Congress"); see also Webster v. Doe, 486 US. 592, 599-603 (1988) (noting
Congress's ability to preclude judicial review).
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administrative schemes and requirements in turn can inform judicial
understandings of what the Constitution requires. Under Mathews
balancing, procedural due process analysis puts a thumb on the scale
in favor of existing procedures being deemed constitutionally
sufficient by framing the inquiry as the extent to which additional
procedures would add to the accuracy of agency determinations.9 9
Similarly, an administrative complaint mechanism can offer very
different relief from that available under Bivens - and in particular,
no opportunity for money damages - and yet suffice for the Court to
conclude that an individual's constitutional rights are satisfied.'oo
Alternatively, in some cases the Court may use existing
administrative requirements to define the content of constitutional
requirements. Of particular relevance here is Miranda: The
constitutional warnings there required by the Court were not its own
independent creation, but instead were the procedures the FBI had
devised to ensure that confessions were not coerced.' 0 ' Another
example emerges from the context of institutional reform litigation,
in which successful programmatic initiatives become identified as
remedies for constitutional violations through their incorporation in
19 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). While the Court has insisted
that legislatively provided procedures cannot be the measure of all the process that
is due, see Cleveland Bd. ofEduc. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985) ("The
right to due process is conferred, not by legislative grace, but by constitutional
guarantee."), this analytic framing of the inquiry takes the government's provided
procedures as the baseline against which additional requirements must be justified,
rather than fostering a more independent judicial assessment of what types of
procedures are appropriate given the interests involved.
1oo For a recent example, see Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 US.
61, 74 (2001), where the Court noted that the inmates in question had the
alternative of pursuing "injunctive relief and grievances filed through the [Bureau
of Prisons'] Administrative Remedy Program (ARP)." For a discussion of two
earlier cases, Schweiker v. Chilicky and Bush v. Lucas, see supra note 28.
101 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US. 436, 483-86 (1966) (citing letter from
FBI describing Bureau practice of issuing warning at beginning of interview,
including "right to say nothing and a right to counsel, and that any statement
[suspect or person under arrest] does make may be used against him in court" as
well as "right to free counsel"); see also Sheldon H. Elsen & Arthur Rosett,
Protections for the Suspect Under Miranda v. Arizona, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 645, 653
(1967) (arguing that FBI practice actually differed with respect to right to counsel
during interrogations, and that "FBI experience merited deeper probing than it
received" from the Court).
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consent decrees. 02 More generally, the Solicitor General is an
influential litigant at the Supreme Court, and thus the federal
government's accounts of its administrative needs and the impact of
constitutional protections is likely to be taken seriously by the Court
in setting the boundaries of constitutional rights.' 03 This role of
ordinary administrative law and administrative practice in setting the
scope of constitutional requirements is of a piece with the numerous
ways in which constitutional law has bent and transformed in
response to the institutional and regulatory needs of the modern
administrative state.1 04
A final feature of note is the evolving nature of ordinary
administrative law, particularly administrative law as applied by the
courts. 05 Despite occasional efforts by the Court and commentators
I02 See David Zaring, National Rulemaking Through Trial Courts: The Big
Case and Institutional Reform, 51 UCLA L. Rev. 1015, 1047-62 (2004) (identifying
housing and prison litigation as two instances in which this phenomenon has
occurred); see also Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights:
How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1015, 1016-52 (2004)
(arguing that experimentalist administrative methods, in particular benchmarking,
performance measurement, and monitoring, are increasingly being required in
consent decrees as mechanisms for remedying constitutional violations).
103 See Pillard, supra note 86, at 689 ("Even when the Supreme Court is poised
to decide an issue, the constitutional views voiced by the executive can shape the
Court's view.").
" Several examples exist, including the rejection of meaningful limits on
congressional delegations; acceptance of administrative agencies' combining
legislative, executive, and adjudicatory powers and novel structures; and massive
expansion in the scope of federal regulatory authority. For two differing
perspectives on the constitutionality of the modem administrative state, compare
Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 Harv. L. Rev.
1231, 1231 (1994) ("The post-New Deal administrative state is unconstitutional ...
."), with Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of
Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 573, 579 (1984) [hereinafter
Strauss, Place of Agencies] (arguing modem administrative agencies are
compatible with constitutional principles). Such accession to administrative
imperatives is also evident in regard to individual rights, as, for instance, in the
acceptance of lower Fourth Amendment protections in administrative contexts. See
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 US. 307, 313, 320-21 (1978) (noting the closely
regulated exception to the warrant requirement and emphasizing lower standard for
establishing probable cause even in other contexts).
10 The executive branch's approach to administrative law has also changed
markedly over the years, most notably with the advent of Executive Order 12,866
and regulatory review, but for purposes of connecting to discussions of
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to posit a static and statutorily based account of administrative law,106
any such account fails to capture much of current administrative law
doctrine. Instead, a dominant feature of ordinary administrative law
is its common law and thus evolving character.' This evolving
character is especially evident in regard to the standards and
availability of judicial review under the APA. The Court not only has
intensified arbitrary and capricious review over time and further
refined its Chevron doctrine, it has also dramatically expanded the
range of persons who can challenge agency action. Moreover, the
Court's rules with respect to timing and preclusion of judicial review
are overwhelmingly common law-derived, rather than statutorily
determined, and as a result have also developed over time.os Such an
evolutionary process is equally apparent with respect to the APA's
procedural requirements for informal rulemaking, with current
requirements of notice and agency response to comments far
constitutional common law my focus here is more on the evolving cast of'judicial
doctrine. See generally Executive Order 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735 (Sept. 30,
1993).
16 See Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs v. Greenwich Collieries, 512
US. 267, 272 (1994) (arguing the APA must be interpreted according to its
meaning when adopted in 1946); Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res.
Def Council, Inc., 435 US. 519, 524 (1978) (arguing courts lack power to impose
procedural requirements not required by the APA, other statutes or regulations, or
the Constitution); see also John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial
Review, 77 Tex. L. Rev. 113, 115 (1998) (acknowledging the common law
character of much of administrative law but arguing administrative law is
becoming increasingly statutory and praising this development).
107 See Jack M. Beermann, Common Law and Statute Law in US Federal
Administrative Law, in Administrative Law in a Changing State: Essays in Honour
of Mark Aronson 45, 45-47 (Linda Pearson et al. eds., 2008) (arguing that federal
courts behave as common law courts when dealing with administrative law issues);
Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Common Law and the Vermont Yankee
Opinion, 1980 Utah L. Rev. 3, 3-10 (arguing that courts, including the Supreme
Court, have created administrative common law throughout the twentieth century).
108 See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law,
88 Harv. L. Rev. 1667, 1723-56 (1975) (noting the Court's conception of standing
and participation rights in administrative law cases has expanded over time); see
also Merrill, Capture Theory, supra note 39, at 1039-44, 1074-83 (tracing
expansion and subsequent contraction in doctrines affecting the availability of
judicial review).
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exceeding what the text of the APA suggests was originally
expected.'09
Constitutional concerns with unchecked agency power underlay
all these judicial developments."l0 Expanded rulemaking procedures
and greater court access, along with heightened substantive scrutiny,
helped guard against otherwise unaccountable agency abuses of
delegated power."' But tying the evolution of ordinary
administrative law solely to constitutional concerns and judicial
development ignores the degree to which this evolution is also
politically driven. Statutes like the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA)ll 2 and government in the sunshine requirements" 3 embodied
10' See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c) (2006) (requiring mere "description of the
subjects and issues involved" and stating "concise general statement of [a rule's]
basis and purpose" will suffice); Am. Radio Relay League v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227,
245-47 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part, concurring in the
judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (noting judicial interpretation of § 553's
requirements does not comport with the text of the APA); Jack M. Beermann &
Gary Lawson, Reprocessing Vermont Yankee, 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 856, 882-900
(2007) (arguing a number of current rulemaking requirements go beyond § 553's
text).
"0 See supra text accompanying notes 39-47.
"I See Stewart, supra note 108, at 1711-60 (analyzing changes as representing
a transformation in judicial review to focus on ensuring that all affected interests
are fairly represented and considered by administrative agencies). Courts
emphasized the connection between enhanced notice and participation
requirements and checks on agency decisionmaking, see, e.g., Conn. Light &
Power v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 673 F.2d 525, 530-31 (D.C. Cir. 1982);
United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 251-53 (2d Cir.
1977), as well as at times invoked seemingly due process-based concerns of
fundamental fairness, see, e.g., Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 875
F.2d 1008, 1020-21 (2d Cir. 1989), rev'd, 496 U.S. 633 (1990). Although express
invocations of fundamental fairness in the rulemaking context have not fared well
at the Court, see Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 496 U.S. at 655-56; Vermont
Yankee, 435 U.S. at 541-43, the Court has made little effort to curb § 553's
expansion, see Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 174-75
(2007) (accepting logical outgrowth rule and its emphasis on "fair notice");
Metzger, Vermont Yankee, supra note 39, at 161-63.
112 Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §
552 (2006)).
"' See, e.g., Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat.
1241 (1976) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C§§552(b), 557(d) (2006)); Federal
Advisory Committee Act, Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972) (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. App. II§§l-15 (2006)).
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new political demands for open government that may have catalyzed
judicial procedural developments." 4 Similarly, the norm of expert,
informed decisionmaking embodied in the reasoned explanation
requirement traces back to the creation of the civil service and
protections for administrative independence from politics in the
formative period of the national administrative state."t5 Over the
years this norm has been reinforced by a vast array of other measures
- prime among them the APA, but also substantive statutory
provisions that demand a scientific basis for regulations and
provisions creating agency structures that give a prominent role to
professionals and substantive expertise." 6 Agencies also often
voluntarily adopt regulatory requirements that limit their discretion
and expand procedural protections.'" 7 These statutory and regulatory
enactments sometimes reflect the political branches' understandings
of what the Constitution demands. But they are more clearly
"constitutional" in the sense of embodying basic contemporary
114 See Peter L. Strauss, Statutes That Are Not Static - The Case of the APA,
14 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 767, 788-90, 796-99 (2005) (arguing that FOIA
provided statutory support for judicial expansion of APA requirements and noting
that Congress also enacted other, statute-specific hybrid procedures).
"5 See Stephen Skowronek, Building a New Administrative State: The
Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877-1920, at 78-210 (1982)
(describing progressive emphasis on expertise and opposition to the spoils system,
and gradual expansion of merit-based civil service).
I16 See, e.g., 42 U.S.Cf§§7408-7409 (2006) (requiring that the EPA promulgate
national air quality standards based on criteria that reflect latest scientific
knowledge); 21 C.F.R.§§14.100, 14.80 (1986) (listing standing advisory
committees at the FDA and qualifications for membership).
1"7 See, e.g., FDA's Development, Issuance, and Use of Guidance Documents,
62 Fed Reg. 8961 (Feb. 27, 1997), adopted and amended in FDA Accountability
and Modernization Act, 21 U.S.C. § 3 71(h) (2006); 1 Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
Administrative Law Treatise § 7.10, at 504 (4th ed. 2002) [hereinafter Pierce,
Administrative Law Treatise] (noting many agencies have issued rules obliging
them to use notice-and-comment rulemaking for matters involving "public
property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts," despite the APA's exemption of
these matters from rulemaking requirements); Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional
Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61
Stan. L. Rev. 869, 891 (2009) (noting most agencies follow the APA's separation of
functions requirements whenever imposing punishment, even if not required by
terms of the APA). For a recent discussion of this phenomenon, see Elizabeth
Magill, Foreword, Agency Self-Regulation, 77 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 859 (2009).
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normative commitments with respect to how government should
operate." 8
The net result of these features is that a good deal of ordinary
administrative law could be characterized as constitutional common
law. As Monaghan defined it, constitutional common law has two
core components: the specification of requirements that are not
themselves constitutionally mandated but serve to implement
constitutional demands; and a role for the political branches in
specifying the shape that these requirements take."' Ordinary
administrative law reflects the same characteristics. Its doctrines are
constitutionally rooted but not constitutionally required, and emerge
over time in a reciprocally informing fashion. Most significantly,
Congress enjoys extensive power to control the contours of ordinary
administrative law notwithstanding its constitutional dimensions.12 0
To be sure, there may be limits to such congressional authority;
efforts by Congress to exempt agencies wholesale from duties of
explanation or to preclude judicial review of broad swaths of agency
action would likely face judicial resistance.12' But those are general
systemic constraints that leave Congress broad discretion to reshape
"18 They are thus arguably examples of what Professors William Eskridge and
John Ferejohn call "small-c constitutional law," or what Ernest Young recently
described as "the constitution outside the Constitution." See Eskridge & Ferejohn,
supra note 87, intro., at 7-17 (describing small "c" constitutional law as super
statutes and their interpretation and implementation by administrative agencies in
response to public norms and needs); Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside
the Constitution, 117 Yale L.J. 408, 411-14, 447 (2007) (arguing "much of the law
that constitutes our government and establishes our rights derives from legal
materials outside the Constitution itself," in particular given the extent to which
"the Constitution permits basic constitutive questions to be answered by
subconstitutional norms"); see also Tom Ginsburg, On the Constitutional Character
of Administrative Law 2-3 (May 7, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Columbia Law Review), available at
http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/CompAdminLaw/Tom Ginsburg
CompAdLaw paper.pdf ("Along several dimensions, administrative law should be
understood as more 'constitutional' than constitutional law.").
1l9 See Monaghan, Constitutional Common Law, supra note 1, at 2-3.
120 The President and administrative agencies themselves also play an
important role, but their participation is in the form of adding additional constraints
rather than reducing statutory requirements. Magill, supra note 117, at 860-62.
121 See Murphy, supra note 43, at 1127-34 (suggesting "elimination [of hard
look review] would affect how courts interpret other means ofjudicial control
which are rooted in the Constitution," in particular nondelegation doctrine).
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ordinary administrative law in particular contexts. 122 Moreover,
Congress has shown little interest in diluting ordinary administrative
law in such an across-the-board fashion, and has at times added new
constraints.123 Indeed, recently the political branches have been more
overt than the courts in their efforts to use administrative law to
address constitutional concerns.' 24
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHARACTER OF
ORDINARY ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Recognizing the linkages between ordinary administrative law
and constitutional law has several important implications for the
debate over constitutional common law. Critiques of constitutional
common law are often premised on the assumption that a clear divide
exists between ordinary law and constitutional law, but as a
descriptive matter that divide does not exist in the administrative law
context. Perhaps more importantly, as a normative matter the
constitutional common law status of ordinary administrative law has
much to commend it. The real weakness in the Court's jurisprudence
is not its intermixing of constitutional law and ordinary
administrative law, but rather its failure to embrace judicially
enforced administrative constitutionalism more thoroughly and
overtly.
122 Cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-
Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1731, 1778-79,
1787-91 (1991) (arguing that while "the aspiration to effective individual
remediation for every constitutional violation represents an important remedial
principle," Congress may constitutionally deviate from that goal provided it
supplies "a system of constitutional remedies adequate to keep government
generally within the bounds of law").
123 See, e.g., 29 US.C. § 655(b), (f) (2006) (outlining procedure by which
occupational health and safety standards are set, including provision by which,
inter alia, interested persons can request an oral hearing, and standards must be
justified by substantial evidence); supra text accompanying notes 112-114
(discussing FOIA and open government requirements added in the 1970s). That
said, Congress has sought to reduce judicial review of administrative actions in
particular contexts, immigration being a central one. See 8 US. C. § 1252(a)(2)
(2006) (outlining "matters not subject to judicial review").
124 See supra text accompanying notes 81-85.
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A. The False Divide Between Constitutional and
Nonconstitutional Law
Constitutional common law has long been attacked as
illegitimate. One prominent line of criticism argues that
constitutional common law violates basic separation of powers and
federalism principles of our constitutional system, which combine to
limit the federal courts' independent lawmaking role.'25 As the Court
famously put the point in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, "there is no
federal general common law."l 26 Of course, the Erie principle has not
governed in anything near such absolute form, with the Court
sanctioning development of federal common law in several
contexts.127 Yet the Court has increasingly emphasized that such
exceptions are "few and restricted, limited to situations where there is
a significant conflict between some federal policy or interest and the
use of state law"128 and are all subject to congressional override.12 9
125 See Grano, supra note 9, at 102-03, 123-29 (1985) (assessing the legitimacy
of the Court's "prophylactic rules - rules that can be violated without necessarily
violating the Constitution" and concluding that in many instances such rules exceed
the Court's constitutional authority); Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law
Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 13-27 (1985) [hereinafter Merrill,
Common Law] (objecting to lawmaking by federal courts on grounds of
federalism, separation of powers, and electoral accountability); Schrock & Welsh,
supra note 9, at 1126-45 (1978) (arguing federal constitutional common law "runs
seriously afoul" of federalism and separation of powers); see also Bradford R.
Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U Pa. L. Rev.
1245, 1248-49, 1256-64, 1269-71 (1996) (outlining the constitutional argument
against "open-ended federal common lawmaking by courts").
126 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
127 See Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 US. 630, 640-41
(1981) (arguing "uniquely federal interests" justify the development of federal
common law where Congress has granted the courts authority to do so); see also
Hart and Wechsler, supra note 14, at 607 ("No one today would seriously dispute
that the body of federal law includes judge-made law. Most would further agree
that such law involves the exercise of some degree ofjudicial policymaking
discretion, rather than the straightforward application of federal statutory or
constitutional enactments.").
128 O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 87 (1994) (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
129 See Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union ofAm., 451 U.S. 77, 95 &
n.34 (1981) ("Federal common law is subject to the paramount authority of
Congress." (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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Hence, as a general matter courts can displace federal and state law
only in the course of enforcing either the Constitution or some other
binding federal enactment. In the case of constitutional common law,
however, the constitutional rule applied by the courts is by definition
provisional and subject to congressional revision, yet is used to trump
state law. Some critics deny that the federal courts have the authority
to impose a constitutional rule that is not actually constitutionally
required. 30
Constitutional common law has not lacked for defenders.'31 Some
scholars have sought to salvage at least portions of constitutional
common law by arguing that the rules imposed actually are
constitutionally required unless Congress imposes an adequate
substitute "that provides roughly the same degree of protection for
constitutional policies as the federal common law rule."l 32 A number
130 See Grano, supra note 9, at 134 (arguing federal courts do not have
authority to "impose implementing 'details' that are not constitutionally required");
see also Merrill, Common Law, supra note 125, at 54-56 ("[A] body of common
law rules 'inspired' but not 'required' by the Constitution presents far more serious
problems of legitimacy than Monaghan acknowledges."); Schrock & Welsh, supra
note 9, at 1131-45 (critiquing Monaghan's posited sources of authority for
constitutional common law). A second line of criticism also leveled at
constitutional common law is that the approach was insufficiently protective of
constitutional rights, particularly by allowing Congress to revise judicial rules
implementing constitutional requirements and encouraging the Court itself to
interpret constitutional requirements minimally so as to leave room for
experimentation. See id. at 1152-53, 1158-71 ("We believe it important to
recognize that the constitutional common law can be promulgated to achieve the
opposite result, a contraction of personal liberties.").
131 Monaghan, of course, was one of these. His justifications for constitutional
common law were largely pragmatic, emphasizing the benefits of the concept as a
"satisfactory way to rationalize a large and steadily growing body of Court
decisions," the Court's special institutional competence in fashioning
understandings of the content of constitutional rights, and "a need for a uniform
national definition of at least the significant dimensions" of constitutional liberties.
Monaghan, Constitutional Common Law, supra note 1, at 19, 35-36. But he also
justified it on grounds of constitutional principle, arguing that the possibility of
congressional revision and dialogue addressed separation of powers and federalism
concerns and underscoring that "constitutionally inspired common law ... is ...
designed to effectuate policies found in the text and structure of the Constitution."
Id. at 35.
132 Merrill, Common Law, supra note 125, at 58; see also Michael C. Dorf &
Barry Friedman, Shared Constitutional Interpretation, 2000 Sup. Ct. Rev. 61, 76-85
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of others have insisted that institutional competency concerns, such
as limits on the courts' ability to identify constitutional violations and
enforce amorphous tests, are legitimate factors for the courts to
consider and inevitably result in constitutional doctrines that differ in
scope from the constitutional provisions they enforce.' 33 Sometimes
the resultant doctrines are prophylactic and prohibit actions the
Constitution might seem to allow; at other times, institutional
concerns lead to underenforcement of constitutional requirements.134
This debate has played out most recently with respect to the
constitutional canons of statutory interpretation. On the surface, this
statutory interpretation context might seem quite different from
Monaghan-style constitutional common law, which is expressly
constitutional in its focus. But although arising with respect to
statutory interpretation, the canons in fact represent a form of
constitutional enforcement. Under the canons, the Court seeks to
protect constitutional values through means such as presumptions,
clear statement rules, and construction of statutes to avoid
(discussing Miranda and Dickerson in these terms and outlining permissible
congressional responses); Grano, supra note 9, at 119-22, 130-32 (arguing some of
Monaghan's examples of constitutional common law are actually mandatory
constitutional rules).
133 See, e.g., Fallon, Implementing, supra note 3, at 5-10, 37-41 (emphasizing
extent to which the Court's function is to implement constitutional norms and
justifying resultant deviations between constitutional doctrine and constitutional
meaning); Berman, supra note 3, at 9, 15-16, 88-100 (distinguishing "constitutional
doctrines that are simply judicial determinations of what the Constitution means
from those conceptually distinct doctrinal rules that direct how courts - faced, as
they inevitably are, with epistemic uncertainty - are to determine whether the
constitutional meaning has been complied with"); Roosevelt, supra note 3, at 1652-
67 (discussing implications of "distinction between the Constitution itself and the
rules that Courts apply in deciding cases"); Strauss, Prophylactic Rules, supra note
3, at 194-95, 207-08 (arguing it is "obviously legitimate" for courts to take their
own institutional limitations into account when formulating constitutional
doctrine).
134 See Strauss, Prophylactic Rules, supra note 3, at 195-207 (discussing how
"judge-made prophylactic rules" may exceed the requirements of the constitutional
provisions on which they are based); see also Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure:
The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1212,
1214-21, 1227 (1978) (arguing some constitutional norms are judicially
underenforced for institutional competency reasons but remain fully binding on
other government officials).
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constitutional doubts.135 Moreover, the parallel goes deeper, because
implicit in the Court's application of the canons and efforts to address
constitutional concerns through statutory interpretation is recognition
that these efforts are subject to congressional revision, with Congress
retaining power to overturn the Court's constitutionally inspired
interpretations.13 6 Hence, the canons constitute another example of
constitutional common law - constitutional or constitutionally
inspired determinations that, while binding, are avowedly provisional
in nature.' 37 Not surprisingly, therefore, some have criticized use of
the canons as an illegitimate form of covert constitutional
" See Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the
Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1549, 1585 (2000) [hereinafter
Young, Constitutional Avoidance] ("The normative values supporting the
avoidance canon are constitutional in nature ... ."); see also Dan T. Coenen, A
Constitution of Collaboration: Protecting Fundamental Values with Second-Look
Rules of Interbranch Dialogue, 42 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 1575, 1582-94, 1735-55
(2001) (describing a number of constitutional "second look" doctrines that
emphasize the process the Court uses in reaching decisions and reflect a
collaborative approach to constitutional interpretation, including constitutional
common law and the constitutional canons as examples); Philip P. Frickey, Getting
from Joe to Gene (McCarthy): The Avoidance Canon, Legal Process Theory, and
Narrowing Statutory Interpretation in the Early Warren Court, 93 Cal. L. Rev. 397,
450-52 (2005) (arguing canon of constitutional avoidance is "a rule of
constitutional adjudication"); Morrison, supra note 70, at 1212 ("The overarching
norm implemented by the avoidance canon is that if Congress wants to legislate to
the limits of its constitutional authority or in a manner that otherwise raises serious
constitutional concerns, it must be clear about its intent to do so.").
13 See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 382 (2005) ("The canon [of
constitutional avoidance] is ... a means of giving effect to congressional intent, not
of subverting it.").
137 See John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, 110
Colum. L. Rev. 399, 401-02 (2010) [hereinafter Manning, Clear Statement Rules]
(describing constitutional canons, including clear statement rules and the canon of
avoidance, as the most frequent contemporary manifestation of constitutional
common law); see also Dan T. Coenen, The Pros and Cons of Politically
Reversible "Semisubstantive" Constitutional Rules, 77 Fordham L. Rev. 2835,
2843-44 (2009) (describing "clear statement" rule as "constitutional 'how' rule,"
whose substantive holding is subject to congressional revision); William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules
as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 Vand L. Rev. 593, 597 (1992) (categorizing the
canons as form of quasi-constitutional law); Mark Tushnet, Subconstitutional
Constitutional Law: Supplement, Sham, or Substitute?, 42 Wm. & Mary L. Rev.
1871, 1871 & n.1 (2001) (terming them subconstitutionalism).
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decisionmaking by which courts restrict Congress and rewrite
statutes based on amorphous constitutional concerns as opposed to
actual constitutional violations.'3 8 In turn, defenders of the canons
have invoked arguments akin to those raised to justify constitutional
common law, in particular maintaining that the canons are no
different in principle from much constitutional law and represent
doctrinal mechanisms for enforcing constitutional norms that, due to
limitations on the courts' institutional competency, are not easily
directly judicially imposed. 139
Underlying many of these attacks on constitutional common law -
whether launched earlier at Monaghan's defense of constitutional
common law or more recently at the Court's expanded use of the
constitutional canons - is a vision of the Constitution as having
determinate limits as well as a binary, on/off character.14 0
138 See Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation - in the Classroom and in
the Courtroom, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 800, 816 (1983) (arguing effect of the canon is to
create "judge-made constitutional penumbras" and thereby "enlarge the already
vast reach of constitutional prohibition beyond even the most extravagant modem
interpretation of the Constitution"); Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995
Sup. Ct. Rev. 71, 86-89 ("The idea that the court is avoiding a constitutional
decision [under the avoidance canon] is illusory. It is in fact making one ... without
the necessity of the full statement of reasons supporting the constitutional
decision."); see also William K. Kelley, Avoiding Constitutional Questions as a
Three-Branch Problem, 86 Cornell L. Rev. 831, 860-64, 867-91 (2000) (noting
concerns about constitutional penumbras voiced by Posner and Schauer and
arguing the canons also illegitimately intrude on the President's Article II take care
power).
139 See Sunstein, Nondelegation, supra note 61, at 337-42 (suggesting canons
operate as nondelegation principles); Young, Constitutional Avoidance, supra note
135, at 1585-87, 1591-93, 1603-06 (viewing canons as a "useful mechanism for
realizing important constitutional values").
140 To some extent, Monaghan himself also accepted a distinction between
constitutional and nonconstitutional law, distinguishing constitutional common law
from, on the one hand, more pure Marbury-style constitutional interpretation and,
on the other, ordinary federal common law. See Monaghan, Constitutional
Common Law, supra note 1, at 30-34 (distinguishing Marbury-style review); id. at
11-13 (describing standard technique of deriving federal common law). Yet in
setting out in essence a tripartite framework - constitutional interpretation,
constitutional common law, and nonconstitutional law, including federal common
law - and in acknowledging that the distinction between constitutional
interpretation and constitutional common law was a matter of degree, see id. at 31,
Monaghan resisted the insistence on a clear constitutional/nonconstitutional
demarcation.
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Governmental action either violates constitutional requirements or it
does not; a judicially imposed requirement either is constitutionally
mandatory or it is not. 4' Wholly excluded is the possibility that no
such clear divide between constitutional law and nonconstitutional
law exists, that a given governmental action could implicate
constitutional values in a way that merits judicial response yet does
not provide a sufficient basis for a court to hold the action
unconstitutional or to preclude congressional revision of judicial
determinations.14 2 Ernest Young articulated this alternative vision in
his defense of the constitutional canons, in which he rejected the
binary model and argued instead that some constitutional
requirements surface as "resistance norms" that "are best enforced
through doctrinal tools that act in the context of statutory
construction." 14 3
141 For recent articulations of this constitutional vision, see Dickerson v. United
States, 530 US. 428, 454 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that a decision is
constitutional only if "the Constitution requires the result that the decision
announces," thus rendering that decision "impervious to supersession by
congressional legislation"); see also John F. Manning, Federalism and the
Generality Problem in Constitutional Interpretation, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 2003, 2040-
55 (2009) [hereinafter Manning, Federalism] (describing the Constitution as
adopting federalism only in form of particular measures and rejecting reliance on
general federalism principles in constitutional interpretation as illegitimately
devaluing the specific compromises on federalism to which the Founders agreed).
142 Young, Constitutional Avoidance, supra note 135, at 1593-94. Interestingly,
many defenses of constitutional common law evidence a similar acceptance of a
divide between the constitutional and nonconstitutional. These defenses have
sought to dramatically expand the boundaries of what qualifies as legitimately
constitutional, but for the most part have not challenged the assumption that a
meaningful divide exists between the constitutional and nonconstitutional. See,
e.g., Dorf & Friedman, supra note 132, at 78-80 (attempting to reconcile Miranda's
constitutional status with its acceptance of alternative safeguards by reading
Miranda's holding narrowly and emphasizing the legitimacy of shared
constitutional interpretation); Roosevelt, supra note 3, at 1655-58, 1670 (arguing
constitutional decision rules may deviate substantially from the operative meaning
of the Constitution, but are nonetheless legitimate); Strauss, Prophylactic Rules,
supra note 3, at 195-207 (arguing judicially imposed prophylactic rules are
ubiquitous in constitutional law, rather than questioning the assumption that they
must be fully constitutional to be legitimate).
143 Young, Constitutional Avoidance, supra note 135, at 1593-94. Young also
rejects the assumption that statutory interpretation should be "constitution-free,"
Schauer, supra note 138, at 83, arguing that "such an approach categorically
excludes a source of statutory meaning which is no less legitimate than other
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The critics' view of constitutional law as having determinate
limits and a binary character is descriptively false when it comes to
administrative law. Far more accurate is Professor Young's resistance
norms model, with general constitutional values and principles being
enforced through nonconstitutional mechanisms such as statutory
construction and administrative policysetting.'" As noted above,
constitutional law frequently surfaces in ordinary administrative law
in a highly indeterminate form; constitutional concerns shape
administrative law doctrines and lie in the background of numerous
administrative enactments, but often the precise scope of the
constitutional requirements involved remains opaque.145
The indeterminacy of constitutional considerations in
administrative settings is hardly unique. It is a commonplace that
numerous core constitutional demands - due process, equal
protection, freedom of speech - are broad enough to support a wide
array of meanings. 146 More importantly, constitutional adjudication is
characterized by frequent resort to general constitutional values and
principles. This is particularly true of separation of powers and
federalism analyses, which are often driven more by general
structural constitutional norms than by specific constitutional
'principles and policies' which frequently enter into interpretation." Young,
Constitutional Avoidance, supra note 135, at 1591-92. Other scholars have
similarly concluded that statutory interpretation is inseparable from constitutional
law. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the
Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 32 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 82 7, 839 (1991) (arguing
that all methodological commitments regarding statutory interpretation must
ultimately be constitutionally grounded); Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes, supra note
57, at 411 (discussing necessity of referencing background principles in statutory
interpretation).
'44 See supra text accompanying notes 59-61 (citing federalism and other
constitutional concerns as basis for narrow interpretation of agency statutes).
145 See, e.g., supra notes 93-104 and accompanying text.
146 See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, On Reading the
Constitution 73-80 (1991) (noting importance of level of generality at which action
is assessed in determining its constitutionality); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The
Supreme Court, 1996 Term - Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 Harv.
L. Rev. 54, 58 (1997) ("Reasonable citizens, lawyers, and judges differ widely
about what methodology should be used to interpret the Constitution, about which
substantive principles the Constitution embodies, and about how, in more practical
terms, constitutional norms should be protected by doctrine.").
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requirements. 4 7 General values also feature in individual rights
contexts, with the Court balancing countervailing constitutional
concerns in defining the scope of constitutional protections.148
Indeed, constitutional common law is sometimes defended as a
mechanism for vindicating general constitutional values and polices.
As Daniel Meltzer commented: "If federal courts have authority to
formulate common law rules to help implement the broad purposes of
statutory enactments, why should the same not be true when the
source of inspiration is a set of values in the Constitution?"l 49
In the administrative law context, indeterminacy surfaces not just
in establishing what the Constitution requires, but also in specifying
when constitutional requirements end and nonconstitutional
administrative law begins. A central feature of ordinary
147 See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2258-62 (2008) (applying
separation of powers principles to interpretation of the Suspension Clause); Gillian
E. Metzger, Response, The Constitutional Legitimacy of Freestanding Federalism,
122 Harv. L. Rev. F. 98, 104-05 (2009), at
http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/LWebsite Content for JenniferForum
Vol. 122Metzgermetzger.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing
structural reasoning in separation of powers case law); see also Manning,
Federalism, supra note 141, at 2068 (acknowledging Court's sometime use of a
form of constitutional analysis in which "overall structure takes on a life of its own,
providing the source for values that are attached to no particular clause of the
document but are nonetheless enforceable as law," but critiquing this practice).
148 See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 420 (2006) (describing
precedent on constitutional protection for employee speech as seeking "both to
promote the individual and societal interests that are served when employees speak
as citizens on matters of public concern and to respect the needs of government
employers attempting to perform their important public functions"); Wyoming v.
Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299-300 (1999) (describing Fourth Amendment test as
"assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which [challenged action] intrudes upon
an individual's privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the
promotion of legitimate governmental interests"); Planned Parenthood ofSe. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 875-79 (1992) ("The undue burden standard is the appropriate
means of reconciling the State's interest [in potential life] with the woman's
constitutionally protected liberty.").
14 Daniel J. Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures of Federal Rights, 99 Harv. L.
Rev. 1128, 1173 (1986); see also Monaghan, Constitutional Common Law, supra
note 1, at 35 ("Constitutionally inspired common law ... [is] designed to effectuate
policies found in the text and structure of the Constitution."); cf. Manning,
Federalism, supra note 141, at 2005-09 (arguing the Court's invocation of free-
floating federalism values in constitutional interpretation is at odds with its turn
towards textualism and rejection of purposivism in statutory interpretation).
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administrative law is the absence of a clear divide between its
constitutional and nonconstitutional aspects. To be sure, many
ordinary administrative law requirements are clearly constitutional or
statutory and regulatory in nature. But what is striking is how many
core doctrines and administrative requirements are simultaneously
constitutional and nonconstitutional, and these dimensions are too
overlapping and interactive to be easily segregated. It is impossible to
know, for example, how arbitrary and capricious scrutiny would have
developed absent constitutional concerns with unchecked agency
power that helped (openly at first, and more tacitly later) fuel
development of current hard look review. It is equally impossible to
know what shape constitutional doctrines, such as delegation doctrine
or rationality review of administrative actions, would have taken
were the APA not available to courts as a surrogate for addressing
these separation of powers concerns. As noted above, the availability
of such ordinary administrative law constraints - particularly ordinary
administrative law constraints that the Court shaped to address tacit
constitutional concerns - has allowed it to avoid addressing these
constitutional issues directly.5 o
Ordinary administrative law thus challenges the image of
constitutional law as substantially determinate as well as the closely
associated assumption that a clear divide exists between
constitutional and nonconstitutional law. This descriptive point
carries normative implications. To begin with, it suggests that the
critique of constitutional common law is based on an image of
constitutional law that differs from how constitutional law actually
operates. Constitutional law does not only surface in clearly
demarcated contexts, but instead seeps into other areas of law, often
operating in the background to shape development of
nonconstitutional legal requirements.
Further, the implications of adopting a narrow and determinate
vision of constitutional law could not be limited to the sphere of
constitutional adjudication; instead, broad areas of what are assumed
to be nonconstitutional law would also be significantly affected. Even
if conceptually possible, segregating constitutional considerations
from ordinary administrative law would be extremely disruptive of
current practice. It would force courts to reconsider existing well-
0so See supra text accompanying notes 33-35.
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established doctrines that appear to exceed their supposed statutory
basis, and potentially to address constitutional questions that they
have been able to avoid through reliance on ordinary administrative
law. Worse, because of this reliance courts may face a gap in
constitutional doctrine that they would need to overcome, limiting
their ability to proceed incrementally and with flexibility.' 5 '
Moreover, any such effort at segregation would effectively end the
common law method of fashioning administrative law doctrine; it is
hard to see how a principled distinction can be drawn between
ordinary administrative common law and constitutional common law,
as the same issue of independent judicial lawmaking is presented in
both.152 In any event, as a practical matter, constitutional concerns
will likely creep back into administrative law doctrines unless the use
of the common law method is more broadly curtailed. In short,
rejecting constitutional common law would force a dramatic change
in the practice and doctrines of ordinary administrative law.
B. Justifying Administrative Constitutionalism
The case for preserving the constitutional common law character
of administrative law, however, goes well beyond avoiding
disruption. My focus here will be on justifying judicial efforts to
encourage administrative constitutionalism, and more specifically on
using ordinary administrative law to force agencies to take
constitutional values seriously in their decisionmaking. Under such
an approach, courts would require agencies to expressly address
serious constitutional concerns raised by their actions. Agencies
failing to do so would face potential remand of their decisions as
arbitrary and capricious - or, alternatively, a loss of deference on the
grounds that their statutory interpretations were unreasonable.153
151 See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 33 (noting the Court's precedents
on procedural due process requirements for general policysetting date back to the
turn of the century).
152 See Monaghan, Constitutional Common Law, supra note 1, at 13-14
(treating constitutional common law as a species of federal common law).
153 For prior suggestions in this vein, see Bamberger, supra note 73, at 111-23
(arguing agencies should be required to take constitutional concerns into account in
their statutory interpretations, on pain of their interpretations being otherwise held
unreasonable); Metzger, New Federalism, supra note 60, at 2104-07 (arguing for
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There are two grounds for focusing on this particular intersection
between administrative law and constitutional law. First, it is the least
accepted incorporation of constitutional concerns into administrative
law. Although some have questioned whether particular measures,
such as the Miranda rules, can be legitimately derived from the
Constitution, the general proposition that governments may be
required to adopt some administrative mechanisms to meet
constitutional demands is not disputed. 5 4 Similarly, federal court
reliance, when possible, on ordinary administrative law in lieu of
constitutional law is simply a manifestation of the rule that courts
should reach constitutional questions only as a last resort, a deeply
embedded and largely accepted judicial practice.' Judicial
development of ordinary administrative law doctrines to address
constitutional concerns is more contentious, 156 but it too has received
judicial sanction in the past and at least is rarely overtly
condemned.157 This approach is also closely akin to application of the
constitutional avoidance canon, particularly when it manifests in
judicial interpretation of administrative law statutes, and thus is not
analytically so unusual. Indeed, the Court's use of constitutional
invalidation of agency action paying insufficient heed to federalism concerns under
hard look review).
15 See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 445-50, 453-54 (2000)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (accepting Miranda warnings would be legitimate if
constitutionally mandated, but denying they have such constitutional status); see
also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349-50 (1996) (noting judicial ability to order
administrative changes to remedy constitutional violations).
155 See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis,
J., concurring) ("The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although
properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon
which the case may be disposed of."). See generally Lisa A. Kloppenberg,
Avoiding Constitutional Questions, 35 B. C. L. Rev. 1003 (1994) (analyzing
appropriateness of last resort rule in different contexts).
116 See, e.g., Am. Radio Relay League, Inc. v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227, 246-48
(D. C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in
part, and dissenting in part) (emphasizing degree to which courts have, over time,
expanded the APA's requirements beyond what its text requires).
"I See supra text accompanying notes 39-47 (discussing Court's earlier
willingness to acknowledge constitutional underpinnings of the reasoned
decisionmaking requirement); see also Metzger, Vermont Yankee, supra note 39, at
160-62 (noting Vermont Yankee's rejection of judicial imposition of procedural
requirements not contained in the APA has not led to questioning of hard look
review or broad readings of procedural demands included in the APA).
473
474 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary
avoidance remains a vibrant part of its approach to statutory
interpretation.'5 8 In comparison, as demonstrated by Fox, the Court
remains quite reluctant to use ordinary administrative law as a
mechanism to encourage administrative constitutionalism.' 59
In addition, judicially enforced administrative constitutionalism
stands out for its emphasis on shared constitutional implementation.
Along with constitutional indeterminacy, this is a key characteristic
of constitutional common law. This characteristic is less evident
when administrative measures are used to satisfy constitutional
requirements, an approach more in keeping with Marbury-style
constitutional adjudication because courts remain largely responsible
for determining whether particular measures are constitutionally
adequate. Strands of shared constitutional interpretation are more
present when courts develop administrative law doctrines in light of
constitutional concerns. As noted, congressional enactments could
trump many such judicially developed administrative law
requirements, and the political branches have certainly imposed
requirements on agencies that reflect constitutional concerns.160 Yet
the invitation to engage in interbranch constitutional interpretation is
much clearer when ordinary administrative law is used to force
agencies to take constitutional values into account in their own
decisionmaking. Development of administrative law doctrine to
address constitutional concerns, by contrast, has been largely a
judicial endeavor.
Despite its condemnation in Fox and general lack of overt
employment by the Court, the use of ordinary administrative law to
encourage administrative constitutional deliberation has much to
commend it. This approach accords well with the administrative
character of contemporary federal government and basic structural
principles underlying our constitutional system, while at the same
'" See Kelley, supra note 138, at 832-33 (noting that constitutional avoidance
has "been repeatedly reaffirmed to the point that it has achieved rare status as a
cardinal principle that is beyond debate" (internal quotation marks omitted));
Morrison, supra note 70, at 1192-93 & n. 10 (discussing centrality of the avoidance
canon and providing numerous examples of its recent invocation).
'9 See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1811 (2009)
(rejecting argument that more stringent arbitrary and capricious review should
apply where agency actions "implicate constitutional liberties").
'6 See supra text accompanying notes 98, 112-118, 120-124.
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time ensuring effective constitutional enforcement and interfering
less with political branch prerogatives than more direct judicial
constitutional enforcement.
1. Administrative Governance and Administrative
Constitutionalism. - Perhaps the strongest argument for requiring
agencies to take account of constitutional concerns is that doing so
acknowledges the reality of modern administrative governance.
Administrative agencies are today the primary decisionmakers in
federal government. To be sure, agency actions are governed by the
terms of authorizing statutes and they act subject to, at times,
substantial congressional and presidential oversight. But these
controls do not alter the reality that agencies wield considerable
independent discretion in setting the shape of national policy and
implementing federal programs.
As those primarily responsible for setting governmental policy,
agencies should have an obligation to take constitutional norms and
requirements seriously in their decisionmaking. Such an obligation
can be inferred simply from the structure of our constitutional order,
under which the Constitution governs all exercises of governmental
authority and all government officials have an independent duty to
support it.16 1 It could also be seen as a condition of delegation. The
Court has made clear that broad congressional delegations of
authority to administrative agencies are constitutional, but it has
failed to adequately consider whether such delegations should come
with constitutional strings attached.162 One such string should be that
161 U.S. Const. art. VI, § 3, cl. 1; see Morrison, supra note 70, at 1223-28, 1259
(justifying executive branch use of the constitutional avoidance canon as following
from "the executive branch's independent obligation to enforce the Constitution,"
although suggesting the canon is inappropriate where an "agency or other executive
component interprets a statute it regularly administers and discusses with
Congress"); Pillard, supra note 86, at 687-88 (discussing obligations and
opportunities for executive constitutional interpretation); Sager, supra note 134, at
1227 (arguing government officials have a "legal obligation ... to avoid
unconstitutional conduct," even if that means interpreting and upholding
constitutional norms that are underenforced by the judiciary); see also 5 US. C. §
3331 (2006) (requiring federal employees to take oath of allegiance to the
Constitution).
162 Cf. Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 Colum. L. Rev.
1367, 1443-45, 1456-61 (2003) [hereinafter Metzger, Privatization as Delegation]
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congressional delegations not serve to remove constitutional
constraints that would otherwise apply.163 Hence, if Congress has an
independent and to some degree judicially enforceable obligation to
take constitutional norms and values into account, as it does under
the constitutional canons and other "second look doctrines," then the
constitutional price of delegation should be that congressional
delegates face this obligation too.
One critical difference between Congress and administrative
agencies is that agencies lack independent lawmaking authority and
can only exercise those powers delegated to them by Congress.16
This basic proposition underlies the well-established rule that a court
will set aside an agency decision as arbitrary and capricious "if the
agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to
consider."l 65 Preserving congressional legislative supremacy thus
entails that courts not require agencies to consider constitutional
concerns when Congress has expressly or impliedly excluded such
factors from agency deliberations. But the instances in which
consideration of constitutional concerns is incompatible with a
congressional regulatory scheme will be rare.1 66 More common will
(arguing that in the privatization context the Court has erred in simply upholding
delegations of power to private individuals without imposing an obligation to
ensure such delegations are structured to adequately protect constitutional limits).
163 See id at 1400-02 (arguing that structural principle of constitutional
accountability requires government power not be delegated in a manner that allows
constitutional limits to be evaded); see also Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229,
2259 (2008) ("To hold the political branches have the power to switch the
Constitution on or off at will ... would permit a striking anomaly in our tripartite
system of government, leading to a regime in which Congress and the President,
not this Court, say 'what the law is."' (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803))).
1" See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 US. 204, 208 (1988) ("It is
axiomatic that an administrative agency's power to promulgate legislative
regulations is limited to the authority delegated by Congress."); Thomas W.
Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive
Delegation, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 2097, 2109-14 (2004) ("It is hornbook law among
administrative lawyers that an agency has the power to issue binding legislative
rules only if and to the extent Congress has authorized it to do so." (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
161 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
43 (1983).
166 Such incompatibility might well exist if the constitutional claim at issue
targeted the agency's very authority to act, for example a separation of powers
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be occasions in which taking constitutional values into account may
change the shape of federal regulation and perhaps make it somewhat
less effective in achieving congressional regulatory goals. In such
contexts, agency consideration of constitutional values absent
congressional instruction to the contrary should still be legitimate.
Congress might well accept a trade-off of regulatory effectiveness for
greater protection of constitutional values. Indeed, Congress arguably
did so expressly in the very statute at issue in Fox, which instructs the
FCC not to engage in censorship or "interfere with the right of free
speech."1 67 At any rate, the assumption that Congress would do so
seems little different from the assumption of congressional
constitutional sensitivity that underlies judicial application of the
canons. 168 More importantly, given the central role of the
Constitution in our governmental structure, unless Congress indicates
to the contrary, the default presumption should be that Congress
intends administrative agencies to consider relevant constitutional
values in their decisionmaking. 169 The importance of constitutional
challenge to the constitutionality of the agency's structure or to Congress's
delegation of certain responsibilities to the agency. But exclusion of such
challenges leaves a wide array of constitutional claims, including those relating to
individual rights or federalism principles, potentially within the agency's purview.
16 47 U.S.C. § 326 (2006); see Note, Communications Act - Scope of
Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 352, 359 (2006) (arguing that
due to § 326, "the constitutional integrity of the shift in the FCC's enforcement
policy became a 'relevant factor' and 'an important aspect of the problem' being
addressed by the agency"). Justice Breyer made a similar point in his Fox dissent,
stating that he was not "claiming that agencies must always take account of
possible constitutional issues when they formulate policy ... .but the FCC works in
the shadow of the First Amendment." FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S.
Ct. 1800, 1834-35 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
168 But see Morrison, supra note 70, at 1222 (suggesting criticism of the
avoidance canon as not tracking legislative intent "seems all the more forceful as
applied to the executive branch").
169 See Strauss, Presidential Interpretation, supra note 92, at 114 ("Almost
always Congress does not intend to authorize the executive to violate the
Constitution; rather, the best interpretation ... is [one] that ... implicitly incorporates
the constitutional limit."); see also Morrison, supra note 70, at 1212-13 (arguing, in
defending executive branch application of the canon of constitutional avoidance,
that actual congressional intent is irrelevant when the canon is viewed as a
mechanism for constitutional enforcement); cf. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,
460-64 (1991) (insisting that Congress must have clearly indicated its intention to
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adherence and enforcement justifies requiring Congress to be clear if
it intends agencies to act without considering significant
constitutional issues raised by their actions." 0
Requiring that agencies consider significant constitutional
implications of their actions is far from the radical proposition Fox
made it seem. Few deny that agencies - like all who exercise
governmental power - have a legally enforceable duty to avoid
violating the Constitution. True, the Fox Court sought to distinguish
between this duty and an obligation to consider constitutional norms
and principles more generally. Yet such a distinction is impossible to
maintain in practice. Agencies must take constitutional norms and
principles into account even to avoid actual constitutional violations,
as they will often face situations in which the import of precedent and
existing constitutional requirements is unclear. Moreover, it is at least
arguable that "the executive branch's independent obligation to
enforce the Constitution" may "entail enforcing [some constitutional]
norms more robustly than the courts would."' 7 '
The real dispute in Fox is instead over whether agencies'
obligation to consider constitutional concerns should be enforceable
by courts under ordinary administrative law. Such judicial
enforcement is not logically required by the proposition that agencies
have an obligation to take constitutional concerns into account.
Indeed, on a departmentalist approach that emphasizes each branch's
independent responsibilities to interpret the Constitution, judicial
enforcement might in fact seem an illegitimate extension of the
courts' role.172 But this complaint ignores the special position of
alter the federal-state balance before a court should read a statute to have that
effect).
170 See Morrison, supra note 70, at 1212-27 (justifying administrative use of
constitutional avoidance as a form of constitutional enforcement). But see Note,
supra note 167, at 359 (arguing separation of constitutional analysis and arbitrary
and capricious review is appropriate except when "the agency's organic statute ...
commands explicit constitutional balancing").
" Morrison, supra note 70, at 1226.
172 For descriptions of departmentalism, see Post & Siegel, Popular
Constitutionalism, supra note 3, at 1031-33 (defining departmentalism as "the view
that each of the three branches of the federal government possesses independent
and co-ordinate authority to interpret the Constitution"); Keith E. Whittington,
Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation: Three Objections and Responses, 80
N.C. L. Rev. 773, 782-83 (2002) ("The most significant historical and theoretical
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agencies. "An agency is neither Congress nor President nor Court,
but an inferior part of government. Each agency is subject to control
relationships with some or all of the three constitutionally named
branches, and those relationships give an assurance ... that they will
not pass out of control."l7 3 Whereas judicial imposition of duties of
deliberation on Congress and the President raise concerns of
unwarranted judicial intrusion into the workings of constitutionally
coequal branches, judicial supervision of administrative
decisionmaking has long been thought pivotal for ensuring the
constitutional legitimacy of administrative action.174
Thus, just as judicial review ensures that agencies adhere to
congressional will and do not exceed or ignore statutory
requirements, so too should judicial review ensure that agencies
fulfill their obligations to consider significant constitutional
implications of their actions. Importantly, judicial enforcement is
only one route by which such policing of agencies' constitutional
deliberations occurs; as discussed above, Congress and the President
have been quite active in instructing agencies to give weight to
constitutional concerns.175 It is hard to see why judicial
encouragement of administrative constitutionalism should be more
suspect than similar efforts by the political branches - especially
given the courts' traditional role as constitutional enforcers.
That leaves the question of whether courts should enforce
agencies' obligation to consider constitutional concerns through the
medium of ordinary administrative law, instead of relying simply on
alternative to judicial supremacy, however, is departmentalism, or coordinate
construction, which denies that any single interpreter is supreme.").
173 Strauss, Place of Agencies, supra note 104, at 579.
174 See supra text accompanying notes 36-38, 40 (discussing development of
hard look review and early delegation precedent); see also Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541
F. 2d 1, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Leventhal, J., concurring) ("Congress has been willing
to delegate its legislative powers broadly - and courts have upheld such delegation -
because there is court review to assure that the agency exercises the delegated
power within statutory limits ... ."); Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of
Administrative Action 320 (1965) ("The availability of judicial review is the
necessary condition, psychologically if not logically, of a system of administrative
power which purports to be legitimate, or legally valid.").
"7 See supra text accompanying notes 81-85 (describing various laws and
executive orders directing agencies to consider constitutional concerns in their
decisionmaking).
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direct constitutional scrutiny. 176 Using ordinary administrative law
for this purpose has several advantages. To begin with, it underscores
the argument that administrative constitutional deliberation should
not be thought unusual, but rather seen as a standard feature of the
reasoned decisionmaking requirement when an agency action
implicates serious constitutional concerns. The fact that such
concerns may not translate into a successful challenge on direct
constitutional review does not mean that they do not merit
consideration by the agency. In addition, the ordinary administrative
law approach better accommodates the various factors, constitutional
and nonconstitutional, that agencies must take into account in setting
policy. Agencies cannot deliberate about constitutional concerns in a
vacuum; instead, they must assess how to take these concerns into
account while satisfying their statutory responsibilities and
presidential policy priorities. 177
Finally, using ordinary administrative law further reinforces the
point that what is demanded is consideration of significant
constitutional implications of agency action, not that constitutional
concerns necessarily trump other relevant factors in an agency's
deliberations. As a result, under ordinary administrative law
principles, a careful explanation of how constitutional concerns were
accommodated or why constitutional concerns are outweighed is all
that an agency must supply. It then becomes the courts' responsibility
to determine whether the agency's decision accords with
constitutional requirements, assuming a justiciable constitutional
challenge is also brought. This distinction demonstrates the error in
Fox's claim that the APA mandates separation of constitutionality in
distinguishing between a court's power to set aside "unlawful"
agency action, which would encompass unconstitutional agency
actions, and agency actions found to be "arbitrary [or] capricious."' 7 8
"6 As noted, see supra text accompanying notes 77-80, direct constitutional
scrutiny is the approach the Court now occasionally uses to foster greater
administrative constitutional attentiveness.
177 See Mashaw, Norms, Practices, supra note 55, at 508-10 ("Agencies must
balance their more remote responsibilities as contributors to the unity of the legal
order ... with their more proximate and primary responsibilities to the development
of one segment of it.").
17' 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006); FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S.
Ct. 1800, 1812 (2009).
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Fox's argument misconstrues the nature of ordinary administrative
law review of agency constitutional deliberations. The focus of such
review is on determining that agencies gave consideration to the
significant constitutional implications of their actions, leaving open
the question of whether the agency's action in fact complies with
constitutional demands. 79
2. Ensuring Adequate Constitutional Enforcement. - The
continued availability of independent constitutional scrutiny merits
emphasis. Such scrutiny ensures that reliance on ordinary
administrative review does not undermine judicial constitutional
enforcement. Even if an agency reasonably opts to pursue a particular
policy despite constitutional concerns, and hence satisfies the
demands of ordinary administrative review, a court may still
invalidate the policy as actually unconstitutional. 8 0 Thus, skepticism
that the executive branch will elevate its political agenda over
constitutional considerations should not fuel opposition to the
ordinary administrative law approach advocated here.'8 '
In fact, however, encouraging agencies to take constitutional
concerns into account is likely to prove a valuable mechanism for
ensuring effective constitutional enforcement in administrative
contexts. Administrative consideration will be particularly important
'7 See Note, supra note 167, at 360 (arguing the "separation of arbitrary and
capricious review and constitutional review into different subsections of the APA
may support the conclusion that each subsection articulates different reasons for
invalidating an agency action" but that "it seems fairly unsupportable and
counterintuitive to suggest that § 706(2)(A) excludes any consideration of an
agency's constitutional reasoning").
Iso Fox underscores the availability of such a challenge. 129 S. Ct. at 1812
(stating the "lawfulness [of an agency action] under the Constitution is a separate
question to be addressed in a constitutional challenge").
'' See Pillard, supra note 86, at 699-702, 717 (noting core question is whether
the executive can "engage in something other than opportunistic, situational
constitutionalism through which lawyers advance whatever arguments support the
president's immediate agenda"). Such skepticism is reinforced by the failures of the
Bush Administration to give due weight to constitutional and other legal constraints
in the national security context. For discussions, see Johnsen, supra note 86, at
1564 ("The proposition that the President's own legal advisors can provide an
effective constraint on unlawful action understandably engenders a high degree of
skepticism - especially in light of recent events."). See generally Jack Goldsmith,
The Terror Presidency (2007).
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in contexts where constitutional requirements are arguably judicially
underenforced, such as federalism, delegation limits, or governmental
funding restrictions.182 In addition, constitutional challenges
frequently depend on complex factual determinations - for example,
about the scope of the burden actually imposed by a proposed
regulation, the availability of less burdensome alternatives, and the
seriousness of the harm the government seeks to address. As Kenneth
Bamberger observes, agencies have particular competence in
investigating and assessing the factual basis that often underlies
constitutional claims.' 83 Even if subsequent judicial scrutiny is
needed to ensure that constitutional constraints are adequately
enforced, that review will be enhanced by agency development of a
factual record, the type of record agencies would need to produce to
demonstrate they had considered the constitutional claims at issue. 184
182 See Metzger, New Federalism, supra note 60, at 2054 (arguing the Court
addresses underenforced doctrines like federalism through administrative law to
defer to Congress); Pillard, supra note 86, at 692-98 (providing examples of
"executive constitutionalism" in various contexts marked by limited judicial
review, such as foreign policy, national security, and immigration); see also Hein v.
Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 593 (2007) (denying taxpayer
standing to challenge executive branch expenditures not mandated by Congress on
Establishment Clause grounds).
18 Bamberger, supra note 73, at 96-99; see also Pillard, supra note 86, at 738,
742, 751-52 (describing ability to take initiative as well as "distinctive,
institutionally and factually grounded insight" as potential advantages of executive
branch constitutionalism, but noting advantages are undermined by concentration
of constitutional engagement in separate departments, in particular OLC and the
Office of the Solicitor General). For a classic analysis of the role of adjudicatory
facts in constitutional litigation, see Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact
Review, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 229 (1985).
184 See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1201 (2009) (noting that
although the Court "has not deferred to an agency's conclusion that state law is
preempted[,] ... agencies ... have a unique understanding of the statutes they
administer and an attendant ability to make informed determinations about how
state requirements may pose an obstacle" to the full achievement of congressional
purposes to which the Court will give weight, with the degree of weight given
depending on the "thoroughness, consistency, and persuasiveness" of the agency's
explanation (internal quotation marks omitted)); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly,
533 US. 525, 556-66 (2001) (reviewing evidence compiled by state agency in
concluding that state regulations banning outdoor advertising of smokeless tobacco
and cigars satisfied Central Hudson requirement that restrictions on commercial
speech not be based on speculation and conjecture, but holding the regulations
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Agencies also have the capacity to devise regulatory solutions that
avoid raising constitutional issues in the first instance, whereas courts
are limited to responding to regulatory choices made by others. Thus,
an agency sensitive to the due process concerns raised by indefinite
detention of deportable aliens might choose to forgo such detention
altogether in lieu of an alternative approach, or decide to employ
detention in only some contexts rather than across the board.' To
take another recent example, an agency might decline to preempt
state measures so as not to intrude unnecessarily on state authority. 8 6
Courts might, of course, impose similar limitations on agency
authority, but some constitutional issues may not reach the courts
and, at a minimum, agency restraint avoids the need for suit to ensure
constitutional values are protected.187
nonetheless unconstitutional because the government had failed to show the
regulations were not more extensive than necessary).
185 See supra text accompanying notes 72-73 (describing Immigration and
Customs Enforcement's adoption of a more narrowly tailored approach to detention
in response to judicial reversal of broader policy). Thus, the statement that an
agency "lacks institutional competence to resolve the ... constitutionality of a
statute," McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 147-48 (1992), is overbroad. Even if
an agency lacks authority to deem a statute under which it acts facially
unconstitutional, it can often eliminate or at least mitigate constitutional concerns
through its implementation choices and in other ways bring its specialized expertise
to bear on the question of constitutionality. See supra text accompanying notes
183-184.
' See Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 140 (2004) (noting federal
agency refused to declare state statute prohibiting state subdivisions from providing
telecom services to be preempted, relying in part on principle that Congress must
speak clearly before restricting how a state can structure its government); see also
Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, The White House, Memorandum for the
Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies (May 20, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the press office/Presidential-Memorandum-Regarding-
Preemption (on file with the Columbia Law Review) ("Preemption of State law by
executive departments and agencies should be undertaken only with full
consideration of the legitimate prerogatives of the States and with a sufficient legal
basis for preemption.").
' See, e.g., Hein, 551 US. at 593 (finding taxpayer does not have standing to
challenge Office of Faith-Based Initiatives as violating Establishment Clause);
Strauss, Presidential Interpretation, supra note 92, at 115-16 (noting "categories of
decisions, in which the issue seldom ends up in court, the executive is less oriented
to the courts' views and the question of executive autonomy in interpreting the
Constitution arises," and describing said categories, such as intelligence activities).
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Of equal importance, agencies are able to adopt and implement
far-reaching reforms that can be more effective than court-ordered
relief in avoiding and remedying constitutional problems in
administrative settings. Decisionmaking by professionals within an
agency and external expert review are important checks on agency
overreaching and arbitrary determinations, but courts are unlikely to
impose such personnel measures on agencies unless required by
statutes or existing agency regulations. 8 8 Managerial reforms - such
as better training and oversight of personnel or enhanced
accountability measures - are often critical in addressing
constitutional problems in institutional contexts, and are frequently
judicially ordered in the context of institutional reform litigation. 89
But such reforms may be most effective when they are developed
internally rather than externally imposed.190 In addition, the Court
has repeatedly signaled a reluctance to intrude upon federal agency
management, insisting on addressing only specific agency actions
instead of broader attacks on federal programs.19' Although court-
188 See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship Between
Internal and External Separation of Powers, 59 Emory L.J. (forthcoming 2010)
(manuscript at 12-14, 19-20, 25-28, on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(emphasizing importance of internal constraints in improving agency
decisionmaking and guarding against executive branch overreaching but noting the
Court's unwillingness to view such internal constraints as constitutionally
required).
189 See Malcolm M. Feeley & Edward L. Rubin, Judicial Policy Making and
the Modem State: How the Courts Reformed America's Prisons 16, 162-69 (1998)
(describing increased professionalization and adherence to dominant national
standards for prison administration as central to prison reform litigation); Sabel &
Simon, supra note 102, at 1067-73 (emphasizing importance of experimentalist
institutional reform in which stakeholders in public institutions negotiate
provisional outcome-based remedies, often leaving institutions broad discretion
over implementation).
190 See Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A
Structural Approach, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 458, 475-78 (2001) (arguing externally
imposed, rule-based solutions cannot successfully address certain structural and
implicit forms of discrimination because external rules are not "sufficiently
sensitive to context or integrated into ... day-to-day practice," discourage "proactive
problem-solving," and create a "narrow focus on avoiding liability").
191 See, e.g., Summers v. Earth IslandInst., 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1149-51 (2009)
(requiring plaintiffs to identify actual and imminent injury from particular timber
sale for which agency did not use notice and comment procedures in order to
challenge general regulation exempting certain categories of sales from such
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ordered systemic relief remains available when necessary to ensure
protection of constitutional rights, broad scale managerial reforms are
far more likely to result from agency initiation than from judicial
intervention.'9 2
Agencies also hold potential as sites for public deliberation on
and engagement with constitutional meaning. Much recent
constitutional scholarship has focused on extrajudicial constitutional
interpretation, particularly through the interaction of social
movements with political actors.' 93 Agencies play a critical role in
these contexts, engaging with the same groups and advocates as
broad statutes and presidential statements are translated into concrete
policies.194 But agencies represent a prime locus for public
interaction with government more generally. Administrative officials
procedural requirements); Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 891 (1990)
(rejecting effort to challenge federal government's general failure to adequately
implement federal land statutes on grounds that "respondent cannot seek wholesale
improvement of this program by court decree, rather than in the offices of the
Department or the halls of Congress, where programmatic improvements are
normally made").
192 See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 356-60 (1996) (noting importance of
right of access to courts, but finding inmate could not pursue claim because could
not show actual injury).
19 The literature on popular constitutionalism and the role of social
movements is voluminous. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of
Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century,
100 Mich. L. Rev. 2062, 2064 (2002) ("Most twentieth century changes in the
constitutional protections of individual rights were driven by or in response to the
great identity-based social movements ... of the twentieth century."); Robert C. Post
& Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power:
Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 Yale L.J 1943,
1945 (2003) (arguing Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment "links the legal
interpretations of courts to the constitutional understandings of the American
people"); Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and
Constitutional Change: The Case of the de facto ERA, 94 Cal. L. Rev. 1323, 1323-
25 (2006) (arguing expansion of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause to cover sex discrimination "was forged in the Equal Rights Amendment's
defeat").
1 See Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 87, ch. 1, at 9, (emphasizing need to
add consideration of central role played by agencies in constitutional development
and noting "administrative constitutionalism ... is the primary means by which
social movements interact with the state"); see also Lee, supra note 88, at 66
(arguing that popular mobilizations, such as letter-writing campaigns, are important
in spurring administrative constitutionalism).
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regularly consult with interest groups and receive data and filings
from members of the public urging a particular course of action on
the government. Moreover, unlike Congress or the President,
agencies are held to a duty to consider and respond to the information
submitted to them in setting policy - a duty enforced by the courts
through ordinary administrative law doctrines such as hard look
review. As a result, administrative proceedings also can be occasions
in which to initiate popular discussion and deliberation about what
the Constitution requires and how constitutional demands should be
met.'19 These understandings may then form an occasion for
beneficial dialogue with the courts - and perhaps with Congress and
the President - about how the Constitution itself should be
understood.
3. Preserving Political Branch Prerogatives. - Perhaps the most
powerful criticism of using ordinary administrative law to encourage
administrative constitutionalism is the fear that doing so will sanction
expanded judicial interference in administrative decisionmaking.
Scholars already attack arbitrary and capricious review as impeding
agencies' ability to function'96 and as strongly affected by judicial
political biases.' 97 Adding the ability to reverse agency decisions for
inadequately considering relevant constitutional concerns might seem
to risk even greater judicial intrusion into policy choices that should
be left to agencies and their political overseers.
195 Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 87, intro., at 12 ("[Administrative
constitutionalism] is more mobile in responding to important social movements and
social needs, addresses its vision and commands to all Americans and not just
government officials, and creates positive structures and affirmative rights ... to
assure opportunities for personal flourishing ... ."); cf. Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic
Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1511, 1515
(1992) ("Although the Congress, the President, and the courts retain an important
reviewing function, having administrative agencies set government policy provides
the best hope of implementing civic republicanism's call for deliberative
decisionmaking informed by the values of the entire polity.").
196 See supra sources cited in note 40
197 See, e.g., Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of
Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 761, 767-69 (2008) (finding "significant
evidence of a role for judicial ideology in judicial review of agency decisions for
arbitrariness").
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The potential for expanded judicial intervention certainly exists
under the ordinary administrative law approach. But such
intervention is not necessarily illegitimate; instead, I have sought to
argue here that it is an appropriate consequence of recognizing
agencies' obligations to take constitutional concerns seriously. 98
Regardless, any assessment of the appropriateness of enforcing
constitutional norms through ordinary administrative law must take
account of the alternatives. One possibility is, of course, that the
Court will restrict itself to only assessing whether the administrative
action at issue is actually unconstitutional, as the Fox majority
advocated.' 99 Although that option might appear to leave more room
to agencies to exercise the policymaking discretion delegated to them
by Congress, its actual effect might be quite the opposite. Direct
judicial constitutional enforcement may yield requirements that offer
less flexibility to the political branches in structuring government
programs and policies. A standard argument made in constitutional
common law's defense is that forcing courts to definitively articulate
the contours of constitutional rights and requirements risks
"improvident constitutionalization" and "imposing an inflexible
regime upon Congress and the states." 200 Constitutional common law,
by contrast, allows "pressures for change [to] be accommodated
either by legislation or by an open reconsideration of the
subconstitutional policy concerns underlying an initial formulation of
the rule." 201 Preserving the political branches' flexibility in
constructing administrative arrangements also supports judicial
efforts to develop ordinary administrative law doctrines to address
constitutional concerns, such as the reasoned decisionmaking
198 See supra Part II.B.l.
19 See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1812 (2009)
("We think [unlawfulness] is the only context in which constitutionality bears upon
judicial review of agency action.").
200 Meltzer, supra note 149, at 1173.
201 Monaghan, Constitutional Common Law, supra note 1, at 28. An example
from the privatization context can help make this point more concrete: Requiring
that legislatures or agencies create adequate mechanisms to oversee and ensure
accountability of private contractors as a constitutional condition of privatizing
limits the political branches' flexibility to structure privatization arrangements as
they see fit, but it is less restrictive than the alternative of making the government's
private partners directly subject to constitutional demands. Metzger, Privatization
as Delegation, supra note 162, at 1457-61.
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requirement, rather than imposing hard and fast constitutional
demands.
Even Fox acknowledged, moreover, that one likely alternative to
requiring that agencies take constitutional concerns into account will
be judicial enforcement of those concerns through the mechanism of
the constitutional canons, in particular the canon of constitutional
avoidance.202 Much recent scholarship on the constitutional canons
has argued that, despite their seemingly milder appearance, decisions
applying the canons can be as intrusive on Congress - indeed,
perhaps more so - as decisions holding statutes to be
unconstitutional.203 If these canons are in fact doing any work, then
they are yielding statutory interpretations different from the reading
that would otherwise obtain.204 The effect is to trump the political
compromise that initially underlay enactment of the measure; worse,
the courts' interpretations may change political dynamics in a way
that precludes easy enactment of clarifying or reversing legislation by
Congress. 205 Whether or not the formal possibility of congressional
reenactment deserves more weight in the equation than these
arguments allow, 206 it is hard to dispute that application of the canons
202 Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1812 n.3.
203 See Schauer, supra note 138, at 74 ("It is by no means clear that a strained
interpretation of a federal statute that avoids a constitutional question is any less a
judicial intrusion than the judicial invalidation on constitutional grounds of a less
strained interpretation of the same statute."); see also Manning, Nondelegation,
supra note 61, at 228 (arguing constitutional avoidance canon upsets legislative
compromises and results in legislative outcomes that may not have been obtainable
ex ante).
204 See Schauer, supra note 138, at 87, 89 (stating effect of constitutional
avoidance is to supplant "a judge's or court's preconstitutional views about how a
statute should be interpreted" and characterizing avoidance as "superfluous" if it
"leads only to the same result that the interpreter would have reached without even
considering the relevance of the Constitution").
205 See Jerry L. Mashaw, Greed, Chaos, and Governance 102-03, 105 (1999)
(arguing that an interpretation that avoids constitutional problems is "likely to be
different from what the court thinks the legislature intended" and probably
"uncorrectable" by the legislature); Manning, Nondelegation, supra note 61, at 254-
55 (discussing avoidance's cost to legislative will and stating "the avoidance canon
may enshrine a result that could not have been adopted ex ante").
206 See Metzger, New Federalism, supra note 60, at 2093-94 ("Clear statement
and other process requirements can pose real obstacles for Congress ... [but]
Congress at least retains the option of reenactment."); see also Manning, Clear
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can prove a substantial obstacle for Congress, given the difficulties
involved in getting federal legislation enacted.
Administrative agencies, however, can respond to judicial
reversal more easily than Congress. In part this is because,
burdensome though administrative procedures can be, they do not
involve the same types of "vetogates" entailed in getting legislation
through Congress and signed by the President.207 Further, reversal of
an agency decision on ordinary administrative law grounds generally
results in a remand to the agency; this is the standard course, for
example, when a court sets aside an agency determination as
arbitrary and capricious.2 08 As a result, the agency usually has to act
in order to have the rule or decision in question take effect,209 and
does not confront the situation Congress may face after application of
the canon of constitutional avoidance: continuation of the challenged
statute in a significantly altered form, but without the political
coalition to enact an override of the court's decision. Moreover,
although formulation of rules and agency decisions may involve
negotiation among many agency personnel, they all at least
ostensibly share the goal of formulating the best policy from the
agency's perspective - and in the end, the agency head generally
wields decisionmaking authority. Thus, a partial remand of an agency
decision does not pose the same danger of overturning careful
political compromises as does application of the canon of avoidance.
An additional important advantage that agencies offer is their
deep knowledge of the substantive fields they regulate and the federal
Statement Rules, supra note 137, at 403-05 (explaining why "clear statement rules
almost surely intrude less than would Marbury-style judicial review").
207 See Metzger, New Federalism, supra note 60, at 2090 (noting the greater
ease with which administrative agencies can adopt policies compared to Congress
and underscoring that "raising federalism concerns through the administrative law
rubric does not erect a permanent barrier to federal administrative action; instead ...
[it] rather results in a remand for further administrative consideration"). For a
description of the vetogates involved in enacting federal statutes, see William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1441, 1444-
48 (2008) (discussing multiple opportunities where members of House or Senate
can kill proposed legislation).
208 3 Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise, supra note 117, § 18.1, at 1323.
209 Even when a court grants remand without vacatur, the agency knows it
must eventually respond or face vacatur in the future. See 1 id. § 7.13, at 522.
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regulatory schemes in question.21 0 This substantive expertise means
that agencies are better equipped than courts to determine how to
incorporate constitutional values and norms with the least disruption
to federal regulatory schemes. Courts may have greater
understanding and appreciation of constitutional values and
principles in general, but they are less competent in balancing
constitutional and policy concerns at a more granular level. 2 11 Often
several options will exist through which to address the constitutional
concerns raised by a statute or agency action. Rapanos v. United
States provides a recent illustration. That case involved the scope of
federal regulation of intrastate wetlands and the concern that such
regulation might exceed constitutional limits on federal power. A
number of different regulatory approaches could address this danger.
Two were suggested by the plurality and concurrence, respectively:
regulating only permanent bodies of water with a continuous
connection to waters of the United States,212 or undertaking a case-
by-case assessment of whether a particular wetland has a "significant
nexus" to traditional navigable waters. 213 But other approaches were
also available, such as exempting any wetlands and tributaries not
clearly navigable waters in their own right, or creating a rebuttable
presumption that wetlands adjacent to navigable waters or their
tributaries are subject to regulation. The federal agencies statutorily
charged with implementing the Clean Water Act have the factual and
policy expertise needed to determine which of these possibilities best
achieves federal water pollution goals while respecting state
authority.214 Those agencies' greater political accountability
210 Cf. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1201 (2009) ("While agencies have no
special authority to pronounce on pre-emption absent delegation by Congress, they
do have a unique understanding of the statutes they administer and an attendant
ability to make informed determinations about [the impact of] ... state
requirements.").
211 See Metzger, New Federalism, supra note 60, at 2081-83 (discussing
relative expertise of federal agencies and federal courts).
212 Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 739, 742 (2006) (plurality
opinion).213 Id. at 779 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
214 See Bamberger, supra note 73, at 96-97 (arguing agencies may have a
"unique vantage" point for understanding constitutional implications of a federal
regulatory scheme); Metzger, New Federalism, supra note 60, at 2082-83
("Agencies likely will have greatest expertise on the specific question of how best
Fall 2010 Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law
compared to courts also means that both the President and Congress
will have more openings for influencing this policy choice when
undertaken in an administrative context.215
C. The Need for Greater Transparency
In sum, using ordinary administrative law to encourage
administrative constitutionalism not only accords with our
constitutional structure and modem administrative reality, but also
represents an important tool for ensuring constitutional enforcement
while also respecting political branch prerogatives. For this approach
to reap its hypothesized rewards, however, the Court must be open
about the relationship between constitutional law and ordinary
administrative law. Otherwise, agencies and courts will lack a clear
understanding of agencies' obligation to take constitutional concerns
into account, with underexploitation of administrative capacity to
address constitutional concerns the likely result.
Lack of transparency, unfortunately, is one of the defining
hallmarks of the Court's precedent in this area. Not only has the
Court not overtly developed ordinary administrative law into a tool
for constitutional enforcement, it has largely failed to identify the
constitutional concerns underlying its development of ordinary
administrative law doctrines. This marks a significant difference
between the Court's use of ordinary administrative law to address
constitutional concerns and its application of the constitutional
canons. Critics of the canon of constitutional avoidance frequently
take the Court to task for failing to deeply engage with the
constitutional concerns leading to the canon's application. But the
to balance federal-state regulatory roles."); see also Brian Galle & Mark
Seidenfeld, Administrative Law's Federalism: Preemption, Delegation, and
Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 Duke LJ 1933, 1948-83 (2008)
(offering detailed comparison of comparative institutional strengths of Congress,
courts, and agencies, focusing on preemption issues); Thomas W. Merrill,
Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 727, 753-59 (2008)
(same).
215 See Bamberger, supra note 73, at 97-100 (discussing ways agency
decisionmaking can "facilitate political oversight"); see also Metzger, New
Federalism, supra note 60, at 2083-86 (discussing how procedural requirements can
enhance congressional as well as state and local input into federal administrative
decisions with federalism implications).
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Court at least identifies the constitutional question at issue and states
expressly that constitutional concerns are playing a role in its
statutory analysis.216 The Court is similarly overt when it applies
constitutionally derived clear statement rules or presumptions. 2 17
Even that degree of transparency is absent in the Court's development
of ordinary administrative law.
To be sure, greater judicial candor and transparency can come at
a price. A court's greater honesty about the concerns motivating its
decisions may reveal unpalatable value choices, raise obstacles to
securing the agreement of multimember bodies, or have worrying
implications for future decisions.218 Candor and transparency can
also preclude certain results. As suggested earlier, the Court's current
silence likely reflects its discomfort with independent federal court
lawmaking when not constitutionally mandated, combined with its
insistence on judicial supremacy within the constitutional sphere.219
Perhaps the Court would not be willing to keep developing ordinary
administrative law as it has and would pull back from current
doctrines if forced to confront the extent to which ordinary
administrative law may be at odds with this understanding of the
216 See, e.g., Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504,
2512-13 (2009) (noting potential constitutional tension and interpreting statute to
avoid it); United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 78 (1994) (same).
217 See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1194-95 (2009) (stating
presumption against preemption); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460-64
(1991) (applying clear statement rule when legislation alters federal-state balance).
218 See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & Philip Bobbitt, Tragic Choices 26-28, 78-79,
195-97 (1978) (arguing it is honesty that reveals the "tragic choice" between
conflicting values, and that "evasion [and] disguise" can conceal any value choices
made); Scott C. Idleman, A Prudential Theory of Judicial Candor, 73 Tex. L. Rev.
1307, 1381-95 (1995) (discussing practical and normative factors weighing against
judicial candor). But see Micah Schwartzman, Judicial Sincerity, 94 Va. L. Rev.
987, 990-91 (2008) (arguing judicial sincerity about grounds of decisions is
necessary for judges to fulfill demands of the judicial role). Moreover, insofar as
judges are not aware of the forces motivating their decisions, greater transparency
may not be easily possible. See Nicholas S. Zeppos, Judicial Candor and Statutory
Interpretation, 78 Geo. L.1 353, 408 (1989) ("When the instantaneous nature of
interpretation shrouds the reasons for the decision, it is hard to fault the court for
not being candid.").
219 See supra text accompanying notes 96-98 (discussing possible reasons for
the Court's reluctance to acknowledge constitutional concerns in development of
administrative law).
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proper bounds of the judicial role.220 My own view, however, is that
such a pullback is unlikely; the constitutional concerns raised by the
possibility of broad and unconstrained agency power run too deep.
More importantly, the Court's lack of transparency about the
constitutional dimensions of ordinary administrative law has
significant costs as well - costs that go beyond simply failing to
exploit the beneficial potential of administrative constitutionalism. Of
greatest concern, lack of transparency is a serious impediment to both
judicial and administrative accountability.22 1 The constitutional
underpinnings of ordinary administrative law doctrines have
remained largely undeveloped and untested by criticism. We have
little understanding of the extent to which agency explanation and
reasoning are constitutionally necessary conditions for delegation, or
of the basis on which such constitutional requirements can be
justified. Critiques of current hard look review, meanwhile, are
incomplete insofar as they target only the doctrine's statutory basis or
pragmatic implications without also assessing its putative
constitutional basis. Lack of judicial transparency also impedes
administrative accountability; not only are the courts less willing to
probe how constitutional concerns factored into agency deliberations,
but agencies themselves have little incentive to identify and justify
the influence such concerns had on their decisionmaking. This
worsens the accountability risks associated with administrative
constitutionalism, as it becomes much harder for the public,
Congress, and the courts to police agency constitutional reasoning
and ensure that agencies do not base their decisions on insubstantial
constitutional concerns. To my mind, these potential gains of greater
judicial candor outweigh its possible harms.
220 See Zeppos, supra note 218, at 404-05 (arguing requirement of candor may
prevent courts from serving a checking function).
221 Another possible effect, if the Court reviews agency action searchingly out
of constitutional concerns but does not state so openly, may be enhanced lower
court scrutiny of administrative action across the board, resulting in unnecessary
intrusion on administrative decisionmaking when constitutional factors are not in
play. See Metzger, New Federalism, supra note 60, at 2108-09 ("From an
administrative law perspective, the danger is that these more extreme approaches
[with courts applying more searching scrutiny] will spill over into contexts in
which federalism concerns are absent.").
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D. CONCLUSION
The time has therefore come for the Court to be forthright about
the constitutional character of ordinary administrative law. The
linkages between constitutional law and ordinary administrative law
are not only diverse, they are longstanding and deeply rooted in
current doctrine. Segregating constitutional law and administrative
law would thus prove quite difficult and disruptive. Worse, it would
forgo the significant benefits to be gained from encouraging
administrative agencies to take constitutional concerns seriously in
their decisionmaking. Rather than clinging to a false divide between
constitutional law and ordinary administrative law, the Court would
do better to embrace this linkage and acknowledge the important role
that administrative agencies can and do play in the development of
constitutional law.
